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Editor’s preface 
This work supervised by Prof. Dr. Michael Schnegg, addresses the question how a 
community in rural Namibia copes with the development of new institutions for the 
administration and distribution of water.  The analysis of this topic takes place against the 
background that in Namibia the responsibility for the water management and supply in 
rural communities has been handed over by the state to the local users in the last years. In 
the course of this process hundreds of communities must develop new institutions in order 
to pump up and to distribute the groundwater.     
The present work is based on several months of fieldwork in the region and was 
promoted in cooperation between the University of Hamburg, the United Nations 
University in Bonn and the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the University 
of Cologne.  
By means of thick ethnographic descriptions the work shows that Knight’s theoretic 
model is most suitable for understanding the process of institutional change. Here, 
institutions are the result of the conflict over the access and control of resources (the water 
supply) and less the result from collective action towards common welfare. Furthermore it 
is shown that the emergence of institutions concerning the water management can only be 
understood adequately if its connection with other resources (particularly land) and its 
embeddedness in further social and political fields are considered. In the work the author 
succeeds in analyzing a complex process of social change and in gaining new insights into 
how institutions emerge and into when conflict arises.  
 
Michael J. Casimir 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Backgrounds of the study  
The backgrounds of this M.A. degree thesis in Social Anthropology are linked to a 
research project initially promoted by the United Nations University – Institute for 
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) named “Water related conflicts in the local 
context” as part of the MICROCON program1.  
For the research purposes underlying this thesis, Namibia was of special interest 
principally due to its climate and law regulations. Namibia is the driest country in the Sub-
Saharan Africa varying from 600 mm rainfall per year in the northwest to less than 50 mm 
per year at the coast. The occurrence of rain during the rainy season from October to April 
is limited to convective showers and is extremely variable both in space and time (De 
Bruine/ Rukira 1997).  
Concerning legal regulations, the government of Namibia has been introducing 
many measurements towards decentralization after the independency in 1990. Specifically 
in relation with the water management, it was decided in 1997 that within ten years the 
responsibility for managing and paying for water services should be progressively 
devolved to community organisations (Republic of Namibia 2000).2 This means that the 
water infrastructure (boreholes, pipes, pumps, windmills etc.) that has been provided and 
maintained by the government up until then should be progressively handed over to the 
members of rural communities. This process was embedded in the framework of a 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) strategy with the following 
implementation schedule (cf. DRWS 2004: 17):  
 
Phase 1:  Capacity Building 1 August 1997 – 31 July 1998 
Phase 2: Handover for Operation  
and Maintenance 
1 August 1998 – 31 July 2003 
Phase 3: Handover for Full Ownership 1 August 2003 – 31 July 2007 
 
Within the first phase, the Water Point Committees and Caretakers should be trained in 
book-keeping and management skills while in the second phase, they should receive 
                                                 
 
1
 For more detailed information about MICROCON see http://www.microconflict.eu/ 
2
 This applies only to the rural areas. In urban centres and townships, however, the state continues to be very 
active and controls great part of the water supply.  
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training in operation and maintenance. In these two phases, the communities should be 
prepared to take over the full ownership of the water points of their respective use (cf. 
DRWS 2004: 30f). 
In 2004, the Water Resources Management Act No. 24 gave the reform already in 
progress a legal framework. This Act stipulates the establishment of Water Point User 
Associations (WPA), which consist of those community members who permanently use a 
particular water point. The members of a WPA have the task of maintaining the water 
point and of managing the water supply services at the water point. Furthermore, they are 
to elect a water point committee whose task it is to manage the affairs and the day to day 
activities of the WPA, including financial matters, and to help resolving conflicts relating 
to water resources in its water management area (Republic of Namibia 2004: part IV and 
V). To realize their tasks, the WPA have therefore obtained several powers such as the 
making of rules for the use of the rural water supply scheme or water point by members 
and non-members, the authority to prevent any person who does not comply with the rules 
or the constitution of a water point user association from using such a water point, the 
authority to adopt measures in order to prevent the wastage of water by any person and the 
power to plan as well as control the use of communal land in the immediate vicinity of the 
water point (Republic of Namibia 2004: part V sec. 20). In the case that the WPAs do not 
manage to deal with any issue they can call on higher management structures. These are 
the Local Water User Associations (LWA), which are formed by the WPAs of a 
constituency. The rights and duties of the LWAs are very much the same as the ones of the 
WPAs (Republic of Namibia 2004: sec. 16). 
In the light of these relatively recent legal developments, then, the communities 
have received the responsibility and a framework of autonomy for managing collectively a 
natural resource that especially in Namibia might not be exactly abundant. This situation 
offers the chance to inquire from an anthropological perspective how mechanisms or 
institutional arrangements are being developed, negotiated and maintained by the 
communities in order to manage the water resources they normally use.  
1.2 Theoretical framework and main objectives 
The discussion on what specific kind of institutional conventions leads to a sustainable use 
of common-pool resources (CPR) has received its mayor expression in Ostrom’s 
10 
 
Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990).3 An 
important message of Ostrom’s outcomes is not only the reinforcement that self-governing 
institutions are indeed possible for regulating many types of natural resources, but also that 
there is a specific framework of institutional arrangements that can be purposively crafted 
to produce collective action and to achieve a sustainable use of CPRs. Taking her 
theoretical grounding from the game theory and through a systematically comparison of 
heterogeneous case studies around the world, Ostrom achieves in identifying the 
institutional conditions that can lead to a sustainable communal natural resource 
management. These institutional conditions or ‘design principles’ are as follows (Ostrom 
1990: 90):4   
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals of households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be 
clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are 
related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.  
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the 
operational rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to 
the appropriators or are the appropriators.  
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions 
(depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by 
officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.  
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve 
conflicts among appropriators of between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize  
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external 
governmental authorities.  
             For Common Pool Resources  that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.  
                                                 
 
3 A standard definition of institutions does not exist. It is rather defined in different ways and when studying 
these definitions, analysts tend to emphasize one element more than the others. Ostrom for example, defines 
institutions as “prescriptive statements that forbid, require or permit some action or outcome” (Ostrom 1990: 
139) and she focuses on the potential constraining mechanism that can achieve sustainable natural resource 
management by preventing individualism, free-riding and environmental ruin (Lewis 2007: 202). North – one 
of the most important institutionalists – for his part, defines institutions metaphorically as “the rules of the 
game in a society” (North 1990: 3). He conceptualizes them as the “humanly devised constrains that shape 
human interaction” (ibid.). Following a rather economic thought, institutions perform in North’s sense the 
function of reducing transaction costs in monitoring and minimizing inefficiency (Lewis 2007: 202). After 
analysing several definitions of institutions, Scott proposes that institutions generally “provide guidelines and 
resources for acting as well as prohibitions and constraints on action” (Scott 2001: 48).  
4
 Besides Ostrom, similar approaches and overlapping principles have been developed by Wade 1988 and 
Baland and Platteau 1996 (see Agrawal 2001 for a discussion of the literature identifying conditions under 
which groups of self-organized users are successful in managing their commons).  
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With her approach, Ostrom stands against the conviction founded in models 
recommending that privatization or state control are the only ways to avoid an 
environmental degradation. These models are Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968), 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, and Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965). All 
lead to the prediction that those using CPRs will not cooperate so as to achieve collective 
benefits. Furthermore, individuals are perceived as being trapped in a static situation, 
unable to change the rules affecting their incentives. 
Besides the identification of these ‘design principles’, Ostrom goes further and 
develops a theoretical framework to explain and predict when appropriators using small-
scale CPRs are more likely to self-organize and effectively govern their own CPRs:   
 
 
In Ostrom’s model, the users of CPRs are perceived as individuals weighing expected 
benefits and costs when making decisions as these are affected by internal norms and 
discount rates. This is the general conception of individual rational action that Ostrom 
takes as starting point. The evaluation of the expected benefits and the expected costs 
depends on the information available to the individuals concerning the benefits (or harm) 
of the proposed rules and about the costs of transforming, monitoring and enforcing of 
alternative rules, respectively. The internal norms and discount rates are affected by the 
information that individuals have, concerning the norms shared by other relevant 
Figure 1. Ostrom’s framework for institutional choice  
(Ostrom 1990: 193) 
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individuals and concerning the range of opportunities that may or may not be available to 
them outside their CPR (Ostrom 1990: 193f). On the basis of the conception of individual 
rational action, then, these three types of information domains containing situational 
variables are, according to Ostrom, what an analyst needs to ascertain in order to predict 
individual strategies. Nevertheless, regarding to this, Ostrom states an important condition: 
“that individuals do not behave opportunistically in order to try to obtain benefits greater 
than those obtainable through straightforward behaviour. This condition implies that 
individuals reveal their evaluations honestly, contribute to collective benefits whenever 
formulas exist for equitably assigning costs, and are willing to invest time and resources in 
finding solutions to joint problems” (Ostrom 1990: 195, my emphasis). In an institutional-
choice situation, then, the alternatives available to an individual are (1) so support the 
continuance of the status quo rules or (2) to support a change in one or more of the status 
quo rules (compare with Figure 1). 
Regardless of Ostrom’s explicit warning to use her approach as a scheme for policy 
projects (Cleaver/ Franks 2005:3), it has been directly translated into project documents 
and serves as guide for taking action for CBNRM strategies.5 In some parts of Africa, for 
example, the practical implementation of Ostrom’s approach has proven to be anything but 
easy (for example Juul 2001; Cleaver 2005). However, theoretically, the approach attracts 
multi-layered criticism by a number of institutional scholars, above all anthropologists.  
Cleaver (2002), for example, states that the evolution of institutions for collective 
action and decision-making may not be a process of selection of mechanisms, which are 
consciously crafted for that purpose (like Ostrom’s approach suggests), but are rather 
formed through processes of bricolage. That is, a process in which people draw 
consciously and unconsciously on existing mechanisms (social, cultural, symbolic, 
resources and relationships) to form institutions for multiple purposes and to affront new 
situations. Campbell et. al. (2001), argues that the emphasis on the regulatory ability of 
formal rules for the usage of resources pursued by CPR analysts such as Ostrom has 
overshadowed that other forms of control, based on tradition and cultural norms, also 
                                                 
 
5
 In the contents of the Water Resources Management Act No. 24, for example, some of Ostrom’s design 
principles can be recognized. Resource users should define rules for members and non members of a WPA 
(design principles 1 and 2) and elect a water committee (design principle 3); resource users get the authority 
to prevent any person who does not comply with the rules or the constitution from using the water point and 
to adopt measures in order to prevent the wastage of water (design principles 4 and 5); and the water 
committee should help to solve water conflicts in its management area (design principle 6). Moreover, the 
WPAs have the autonomy of developing their constitution (design principle 7) and the WPAs can call on 
higher management structures (the LWA) if they do not deal to manage with any issue (design principle 8). 
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influence the use of resources. Some authors criticise the assumption made by the CPR 
school that the environments in which the communities live are relatively stable whereas 
these variability has to be coped by the resource users (Mehta et. al. 1999); others 
remarked that the communities are seen as a bounded, relatively homogeneous entity 
capable of acting collectively in terms of common environmental interests (Leach/ Means/ 
Scoones 1999).  
However, maybe the most interesting point of criticism is the issue of power. The focus on 
collective actions is said to have distracted attention from the fact that institutions are 
characterized by conflict, factional division and power politics (Metha et. al. 1999). As 
shown above, in Ostroms model, institutional arrangements occur as a result of the 
conscious realization of opportunities that can lead to the achievement of collective goals. 
Individuals cooperate, therefore, after a consideration of costs and benefits of their 
engagement in binding contracts (cf. Ostrom 192ff). This means that in order to achieve 
the institutional conventions, which make them use their resources sustainably and share 
equally the costs of their agreements, the individuals have to have a certain degree of 
willingness to do so, besides their differing interests regarding the resource. If the 
achievement of collective goals is not necessarily the primary motivation for institutional 
development and change, then, institutions can become rather a by-product of strategic 
conflict over substantive social outcomes (Knight 1992). If actors act in a self-interested 
strategic manner seeking those institutional rules that gives them the greatest share of 
benefits, institutional development, then, would turn into a contest or a bargaining game 
determined by the parties’ relative abilities – i.e. bargaining power – to force others to act 
in ways contrary to their unconstrained preferences. In other words, institutional 
conventions would come into being “not because [individuals] have agreed to them […] 
but simply because they cannot do better than to do so” (Knight 1992: 127). Lastly, 
institutions change, then, when strategic actors assume “that they have the power to change 
them, external events change and alter the long-run benefits produced by them” or if they 
assume that other arrangements will produce a more favourable distribution [for them]” 
(ibid.). 
Surprisingly, the critics which point the missing role of power in Ostrom’s model 
have rarely made the attempt to make a theoretical analysis of it. Predominately, instead, 
they just have named the deficiency of her model by giving examples from the field. In this 
paper, however, Knight’s theoretical approach is taken as a basis for discussion for the 
findings regarding the water conflict in the research setting. Correspondingly the objective 
14 
 
will be to analyse if the models of Ostrom and Knight can complement one another or not. 
Moreover, the bargaining strategies and resources of the participants, which are used to 
impose or defend their interests or their needs will be outlined in particular, since they 
constitute the mechanisms through which the bargaining game is characterized: namely, 
not through verbal offers and counteroffers within the framework of a water committee or 
community meeting, but by a sequence of actions and counteractions. With this, the 
intention is not merely to outline the ‘rules of the game’, but rather the tactics and 
strategies through which various actors attempt to legitimate actions – an important 
demand made by several institutional researchers (cf. Juul 2001: 72 and Lund 2007: 21). 
Besides this, it is also analysed why one of the central actors of the conflict (the presumed 
Headman of the community) could afford to maintain a non-cooperative relationship with 
his neighbours and to act against social embedded institutions i.e. to deny the water to his 
neighbours arbitrarily by locking the hand pump.6 Here, following Knight, the Headman’s 
“breakdown values” (the costs of non-cooperation) is depicted and discussed to what 
extent his actions are an exercise of power towards his neighbours in the context of 
dependence relationships (Emerson 1962).  
This paper is to be considered as a contribution to the body of critics, claiming that 
ideas of CBNRM commonly oversimplificate social reality and social process (cf. Cleaver 
2005: 3f). Besides power struggles, the environmental uncertainty as the variability of 
natural resources (Mehta et. al. 1999), and the social heterogeneity in economic terms (cf. 
Adhikari/ Lovett 2006) (at least until a certain extent), are important aspects that, in this 
case study, are shaping the development of institutions and are apparently even impeding 
cooperation among users. To this, the aspect of land use is also addressed since its 
interconnection with water access is also an important aspect in the conflict of the explored 
community. This should elucidate that developing institutional arrangements for the water 
use implies at the same time finding conventions for the use of land; otherwise a breeding 
ground for conflicts can arise. Finally, as the community is not gathering nor negotiating 
any kind of rules for the water management, it is discussed, if the households in the village 
are damaging or overusing the water resources in the area because of failing formal 
institutions.7 
                                                 
 
6
 A social embedded institution is an institution based on culture and daily practice (Cleaver 2002: 13). 
7 Here, formal institutions are understood „as rules that require exogenous enforcement by a third party or 
organisation“ (Leach et. al. 1997: 238). In the case study, the third party is be understood as the water 
committee.  
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into nine sections. After this introductory segment, in section two 
the selection procedure of the region and of the research setting, as well as an overview of 
the methods applied in the field, their goals and implementation will be depicted. 
Subsequently, in section three, the research difficulties in the field are explained. The next 
section presents a brief list of the gathered data and a list of the participants in the study. 
The fifth section is concerned with a general description of the research setting. Its 
subsections outline, among others, aspects related with population numbers, households’ 
sizes, political organization and general economic aspects of the researched community. 
Although the water usage and administration might be closely related to economic issues, 
due to the emphasis of this work on water, a separate segment is exclusively devoted to 
this topic: section six contains an overview of the water infrastructure in the research 
setting, its usage and management regulations. Subsequently, section seven provides a 
broad description of the water conflict in the research setting and its different aspects. In 
section eight, a discussion or rather an analysis is carried out on the findings of this study 
in reference to the theoretical foundations depicted in section two. The final section (nine) 
presents the conclusions of the project.  
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2 Approach 
2.1 Selection of the region and of the ethnographic setting  
The selection procedure for the region in which the study should be carried out was guided 
by the expertise and local knowledge of Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig (University of Cologne) 
and Prof. Dr. Michael Schnegg (University of Hamburg). The chosen region, the 
Sesfontein Constituency, adjoins the territories in which both of them already have 
conducted several anthropological investigations. Hence, the surroundings of the 
Constituency were well known and I could rely on various persons – with whom Prof. Dr. 
Michael Schnegg had previous experience – for assistance as well as insight regarding the 
research site before carrying out the fieldwork. These contacts were used for attaining 
general information of the communities in the area and for finding an interpreter. Besides 
for these practical reasons, the Sesfontein Constituency was chosen because there has been 
little anthropological fieldwork conducted there regarding water-related problems, only 
focussing predominantly on land property disputes (for example Sullivan 2003, 2004). By 
conducting scientific research in this region, the anticipation was to contribute to the 
exploration of this relative uncharted topic in the area.   
The Sesfontein Constituency is characterized by a typically arid (dry) climate with low 
rainfall, high temperature, low humidity and high evaporation. The average annual rainfall 
ranges from < 100mm along the coast to about 150-200 mm per annum towards the east. 
The frequency of the rain is 20-30 days during the rainy season; the rainfall variability is 
 
Figure 2. Location of the Sesfontein Constituency 
(Source: Gulelat 2002) 
 
17 
 
very high, which is a 50-60% deviation from the annual average. Moreover, the length of 
the rainy season is 1- 2 months with the peak occurring in March. The summer average 
daily temperature ranges from 31Cº- 33Cºand the winter temperature ranges from 8Cº-9Cº 
(Gulelat 2002: 10). The water sources in the area consist of natural water fountains or 
rainwater traps, boreholes supplied with machine pumps or hand pumps and wells (Gulelat 
2002: 13).  
The population of Sesfontein Constituency is constituted mainly by four mayor 
ethnic groups. These are Himba, Herero, Damara and Nama. The Herero and Himba are 
ethnic groups belonging to the Bantu language family, while the Damara and Nama belong 
to the Khoisam language family. Nowadays, in rural Namibia, these groups tend to practice 
a combination of cattle herding and subsistence agriculture, whereas cattle rearing plays a 
more essential role. Wage paying jobs and tourism bring them – in some cases –additional 
earnings (see for example Klocke-Daffa 1999, Schnegg 2009 and Murhpy 2003).8 
In order to collect data, anthropological fieldwork was carried out actually in two 
rural communities in the region of the Sesfontein Constituency (North-West Namibia) for 
five to six weeks respectively. The time scheduled for the corresponding research activities 
was for three months between the 11th November 2008 and the 11th February 2009.9 
Nevertheless, due to mechanical problems with the off-road vehicle on site, the start of the 
empirical work was delayed until the 18th December 2008. Though the terminal date for 
the research activities could be rescheduled for the 27th February; there was, one week less 
for the research activities than originally programmed.10 At this place, however, it is 
important to mention that this work focuses only on one of the selected communities – the 
one with the more intense conflict – due to space limitations. The description and analysis 
of the other community will later follow elsewhere. 
In order to select the two communities for the research project, two main criteria 
were taken into account. The villages should have between 12 and 15 households and they 
should denote a situation of conflict (this last criterion was specifically according to the 
                                                 
 
8
 Due to the limitations of this report, the history of these ethnic groups cannot be referred to in detail. For 
further information, see Hahn et. al. 1928 or Malan 1998. 
9
 The week before the beginning of the research activities was scheduled to make the necessary equipment 
procurements for the fieldwork, to prepare the vehicle for the journey and to conduct preliminary research at 
the Namibian Ministry of Agriculture Water and Forestry. The week after concluding the research activities 
should be used principally for servicing the vehicle as well as making the last necessary inquiries.  
10
 Until the 18th of December, the time was principally spent in making visa arrangements and obtaining the 
necessary permissions in order to extend my stay. The rest of the time was invested in library research.   
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objectives of the UNU-EHE project).11 In this context the term “conflict” was broadly 
understood “as an awareness, by the parties involved, of differences, discrepancies, 
incompatible wishes, or irreconcilable desires” (Boulding 1962 cited in Sell et. al. 2004: 
46) in relation with water issues.   
While the selection of the communities for the study was being carried out, I 
temporarily stayed in Sesfontein (approx. 800 inhabitants), the largest settlement in the 
same-named constituency. Food supplies as well as the only diesel supply facilities in the 
area are located in Sesfontein along with reference persons and local experts known by 
Prof. Dr. Schnegg, whom could be contacted in order to obtain some starting assistance. 
Through consulting these persons and with the help of my interpreter (who I employed 
with the advice of the reference persons known by Prof. Schnegg), altogether five villages 
could be short-listed.12 Unfortunately, these five communities had a quite small number of 
households (8 to 10), but the other villages that came into question were quite large (18 to 
20) in contrast. Considering the relatively short time at disposal for the research activities, I 
preferred to select two small villages in order to be able to carry out a more thorough 
investigation with less time pressure.   
In order to get a closer impression of the short-listed communities and to learn more 
precisely if they were dealing with water problems or with a water-related conflict, we 
carried out a visit to each village.13 Upon arriving at the villages, the Headman of the 
respective community was approached in order to introduce ourselves, explain our research 
and to ask permission if the study may be conducted in their villages. As the Headmen 
have generally a good overview over their communities and over the problems being dealt 
with (so my interpreter), we decided to choose them as our key-informants during the pre-
study-phase of the research settings. In this way, we informed ourselves about the water 
problems or conflicts in the short-listed villages. Only in one of the five visited settlements, 
could the Headman not be found. He was absent due to personal matters in other places far 
away from the village. In this case, a villager known by my translator was our contact 
person.  
Although the Headmen were assumed to know their communities very well, I was 
aware of the fact, that only a partial view from the circumstances in the village concerning 
                                                 
 
11
 Larger communities were not scheduled for the project due to time limitations.  
12
 My interpreter knows the region very well due to his regular work as a tourist guide. At the time of the 
research activities, he was 24 years old, unmarried and living with his mother, brothers and sisters. 
13
 «We» are the researcher and the translator.  
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water issues would be recorded by these first interviews. Since they are part of their 
respective communities, it could not be ruled out that they themselves are part of the 
conflict. Nevertheless, I was also aware that we could only get a superficial impression of 
the situation in the villages as several and more extensive interviews with different 
interlocutors would have been necessary to gain a deeper insight into the circumstances. 
This, in turn, would have implied several visits to the communities, which would have 
been very difficult to accomplish due to the time limitations described above.14  
After visiting the five villages, water problems, latent tensions and conflicts in all 
of them could be assessed. At the end, however, the two villages in which subsequent 
fieldwork was carried out were selected primarily because of their particular circumstances 
in relation with their water problems and potential tensions regarding the water 
management. In the following, the situation of the village this paper is focused on will be 
described briefly. 
Upon arriving in the village, which I will call here Okarongo, we met a young 
woman and asked her if we could speak to the Headman of the community.15 She said, she 
was his daughter and led us to a tourist campsite, where we found him. Her father, Simon, 
a man in the end of his fifties, wearing an old fashioned and dirty hat with only the half of 
its brim, but with modern Ray Ban sunglasses covering his one blind eye, presented 
himself to us not only as the Headman of the community, but also as the owner of the 
water point as well as the owner and manager of the campsite. After some small talk and 
explaining him the reason for our visit, he told us that he was the first settler in the area and 
that he was the one who dug the borehole on his own account before the other people 
settled in the village. The Headman told us that at first, the water hole was open and that 
water could only be fetched by pulling it up using a bucket. Nevertheless, in 2006, he had 
managed to install a hand pump over it. Although other community members had tried 
throughout the course of time to construct another water point with a hand pump, Simon 
told us that in fact his was the only watering place being used in the village, because the 
other one got damaged shortly after it was dug.  
                                                 
 
14
 Moreover, apart from the long distances that (partly) had to be covered in order to reach the communities, 
the Headmen were approachable at best either very early in the morning (between 6 and 7 a.m.) or in the 
afternoon (after 4 p.m.), when the daily activities were finished (according to my interpreter). So, the visits 
could only be carried out at certain times. Furthermore, in respect of our interlocutors, it was scheduled from 
the beginning to visit the settlements twice in order to communicate with them if their village had been 
chosen for the study or not; a task that implied time investment as well.   
15
 In order to protect the anonymity of the informants, their names and the name of their village have been 
changed in this paper.  
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To the question if there was a water committee, our dialogue partner responded 
affirmatively that he was the chairperson of the committee. To the question if the 
community was having water problems or a difficulty developing rules for the water 
management, the Headman only expressed his preoccupation in relation with the increased 
number of people settling nowadays in the area and using his water point. His concern was 
the scarcity of the water due to the increase in usage. If this situation, in turn, had been a 
source of conflict in the past or in the resent days, Simon said it had not.  
While our visit, four South African students had been volunteering since three 
weeks with the amelioration of the Headman’s campsite and so we took the opportunity to 
talk to them. Some of the renovations that the students were carrying out were in order to 
make the camping place more attractive to tourists and to ameliorate the cultivation of 
vegetables/fruits by constructing a small pool for collecting rainwater in order to irrigate 
the garden. Both were means to improve the income of the community, said one of the 
students. The campsite was constructed by Simon and has been functioning since 1998. 
The shower, the toilet and the garden situated in it at the time of our visit were being 
provided with the water from Simon’s water point.  
Although at first glance, the community was not having any pronounced conflicts, 
there were some interesting details that indicated some potential tensions regarding the 
water management in the village. One of these was the Simon’s preoccupation with the 
increased number of households using his water point. This reflected his uncertainty 
regarding the water availability of water at the water point and the fear of resource overuse. 
With this background in mind, the question arose how the community was dealing with 
this issue and how it was shaping the water access and usage in the community. 
Considering the privileged bargaining position of our informant (i.e. Headman, owner of 
the water point and owner of a campsite that was apparently bringing benefits to the whole 
community), I asked myself if the negotiation of the water usage/access rights were really 
running without any kind of tensions, like Simon suggested. Did he, thanks to his position 
and principally through the ownership of the water point, have an advantage that facilitated 
him to impose his interests over those of the community concerning the water access and 
usage? Therefore, were there any kind of power or dependency relations between him and 
the community involving water access rights? 
It was principally these questions, which led to the decision of selecting Okarongo 
for the study. After reviewing the situation in the other villages and their suitability for the 
research, the circumstances in Okarongo were thought to be an interesting link for an 
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ethnographic fieldwork, where they could be scrutinized deeply through the designed 
methodological approach for the project (see next section). My interpreter did not have any 
objections to camping permanently in the village during the research activities, although 
Sesfontein, where his household was located, was more than one hour drive away.16 After 
having visited the other villages in order to inform their respective Headmen that we would 
not conduct the study in their communities, we came back to Okarongo in order to inform 
Simon that the settlement had been selected for the study and he reconfirmed to us his 
permission to erect our tents in the area.17 
2.2 Applied methods 
In order to gain a broad range of insights into the socio-economic and cultural 
circumstances of the village and, to better understand the present situation of conflict, this 
study applied several methods for data collection. In this section, each method and its 
respective goal as well as the procedure is described in detail.  
2.2.1 Participant Observation 
The research project followed an ethnographic approach on-site for a period of 
approximately five weeks in each community. For this reason, Participant Observation in 
the field was an inherent part of this study. Participant Observation implies proximity to 
the participants of the studied community/society with the aim of establishing social 
relations in order to learn about the everyday life in the research site (Hauser-Schäubling 
2003: 34, 38). Therefore, Participant Observation was for this study a very important 
instrument to understand the daily routine of the community and, to be able to design 
proper questions for the ethnographic census, to develop the questionnaires for the group 
Network Analysis and for the semi-structured interviews. In addition, as a supplement to 
the methods described above, Participant Observation helped in gaining a better 
understanding of possible discrepancies between how the participants described their 
behaviour in the interviews and how they actually behaved. Other forms of cooperation, 
rivalries and some interactions between the villagers that were not or could not be assessed 
with the other implemented methods, could also be better recorded or became clearer 
through this research tool.  
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 For accepting these circumstances, I am very grateful to him.   
17
 The arguments told to the Headmen why we did not choose their communities referred principally to 
reasons of comparability, since the project was planed for two villages.  
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While applying this method, the cultural knowledge of my interpreter as well as his 
perspicacity was very helpful. Through his advice I was able to better understand what I 
was observing so to better predict when to be prudent and where to place emphasis.   
2.2.2 Ethnographic Census  
At the beginning of my fieldwork activities in the settlement, an Ethnographic Census was 
carried out in order to gain an acquaintance with the villagers as well as to obtain a general 
overview of the researched community as quickly as possible. The Ethnographic Census 
questionnaire is a proper methodological instrument to collect systematic basic information 
from a (more or less) defined and manageable entity like the community foreseen for this 
project.  
During the preparation phase in Germany, the design of the census was constructed 
based upon the guidelines proposed by Lang & Pauli (2002) and conceived under the 
mentoring of Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig (Institute of Social Anthropology University of 
Cologne) as well as Prof. Dr. Michael Schnegg (Institute of Social Anthropology 
University of Hamburg). As the specific situation in the future research site could not be 
foreseen with accuracy, we were aware of the fact that the census questionnaire could, or 
rather, should be supplemented or modified according to the circumstances found in the 
selected research-site. Thus, informal conversations with several community members, 
Participant Observation, the advice of my interpreter and a corresponding pre-test were 
crucial for compiling the final version of the census questionnaire in the community. Other 
necessary modifications were also carried out throughout the course of the fieldwork.  
The household was the unit of investigation for conducting the survey. There are 
several definitions of household (see for example Mc Netting et al. 1984), which cannot be 
discussed here. However, generally speaking a Household can be viewed as a production 
and consumption unit (Rössler 1999: 149). This study adopts an emic definition of 
household, which was constructed based on previous interviews in order to record data 
according to cultural conceptions. Thus, the household has been defined as “a group of 
people living, farming and normally sharing food together”. This definition does not 
include any family members living temporarily or permanently outside the village whom 
could be considered part of the household: the so-called “de jure” population (Lang & 
Pauli 2002: 6). For this reason, the participants were asked to mention if there were any 
children attending schooling outside the village and if there were persons they would 
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consider as household members living outside the community temporarily (or if applicable, 
permanently).18 This inquiry is considered to be important since these household members 
could be receiving financial support originating from the livestock husbandry, which in 
turn, would have a direct influence on the water consumption. Additionally, this inquiry 
helped in gaining a general insight into the economy strategies of the households since the 
household members living outside the community could be sending money remittances to 
their respective households (see for example Greiner 2008).   
The census contained several basic questions asking for the age, gender, place of birth, 
ethnic group, family and migration backgrounds, etc. of each household member. 
Additionally, the census also inquired about the profession, current occupation and 
division of labour as well as income strategies of each household.  
Considering the focus of this project, several questions relating to water issues were 
formulated inquiring about water fetching habits, amounts, frequency and general water-
usage in the households. Moreover, as the main economic activity in the region is livestock 
farming, which strongly affects water-usage, the number of animals kept by each 
household was recorded along with which animals are brought to the watering points, how 
often they are brought and how long the animals remain at the points. Another important 
economic activity in the region is the subsistence irrigation agriculture using small plots of 
gardens. Therefore, inquiries about the ownership of gardens, their size and their 
cultivation and irrigation infrastructure were formulated. The last question of the census 
was aimed to scrutinize the specific water problems in the village (Are there any problems 
concerning water? YES/NO If YES which?).19 Altogether, 49 questions were formulated in 
the census. 
The participants, who responded to the census questionnaire, were mainly the 
Heads of the households. In cases where they were absent, the interview was carried out 
with their wives or other adult household members in order to make good use of time.20 
When the Head of the household returned to the village, the census was supplemented 
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 In the region it is common that the children stay in school hostels during the schooling season.  
19
 The answering of the last question of the census, however, stretched itself throughout the whole duration of 
the fieldwork since several visits to the households were necessary to better understand the dynamics of the 
conflicts.  
20
 Before beginning with the research activities, I told my interpreter that his task should not be limited to 
translating, but that he should also give me advice based on his cultural knowledge, for example, when 
certain interviews should be carried out and when it is prudent to end an interview. In this way, I was able to 
determine when it was appropriate to proceed knowing it was not a problem for the Head of the household. 
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where necessary with their additional information. Depending on the household, it took a 
minimum of one hour and a maximum of four hours to carry out a census questionnaire.  
Before beginning with the survey, the participants were informed about the purpose 
of the study and were provided with information on how the data would be used, that is, 
the degree to which the information would be kept confidential. They were also informed 
about the questions that would be asked, how long it would take and that participation is 
voluntary. Due to the possibility of handling sensitive information related with a water 
conflict, the participants were asked if they wanted to respond to the questionnaire 
(especially to the last question of the census) in a place in which they felt most 
comfortable.    
2.2.3 Extended Case Method 
Problems or rather (potential) conflicts were identified on the basis of the ethnographic 
census. In order to analyse them subsequently in detail, the frameworks of the Extended-
Case Method (ECM) have been applied. The ECM is defined as the detailed study from 
specific or chained events from which general theoretical principles can be derived 
(Mitchell 1983: 192 cited in Rössler 2003). As other studies have shown (compare Rössler 
2003), this method is well suited for exploring the development of social conflicts, the 
negotiating of individual interests, the interpretation and use of rules and norms as well as 
the arising and the decay of social bonds. Within this methodological approach, Participant 
Observation and ethnographic interviewing play a central role (Burawoy 1998; Sullivan 
2002). 
The other methods described below (the Wealth Ranking, the conflict mapping, the 
group and individual Network Analysis) have been utilized not only as tools for describing 
general circumstances in the community, but also to better understand and to describe in as 
much detail as possible the situations of (potential) conflict within the village.  
2.2.4 Semi-structured Interviews and informal conversations 
Based on the information gathered through the survey, a respective list of questions was 
developed concerning additional topics in need of being covered in further semi-structured 
interviews. Nevertheless, the progressive identification of expanded levels of social context 
until data saturation implied in the inductive emphasis of the ECM (Strauss/ Corbin 1998) 
could only be applied to a constrained extent (see section 3).    
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The Semi-structured Interviews, however, did prove to be very useful as it 
demonstrated the interviewee that I was interested in a particular subject, but left both me 
and the respondent free to follow new leads  (Bernard 2006: 212).  
The Heads of the households were our main dialog partners. However, we did 
approach any adult villager (male/female), who could help us to understand specific aspect 
of the water problems or conflicts or who was somehow involved or playing a relevant role 
in them (for example, the water committee members). In addition, the interviews were 
conducted in places where the participants felt most comfortable to talk freely. The 
interviews took a minimum of 15 minutes or a maximum of two hours depending on the 
participant and the topic. Apart from interviewing community members, one semi-
structured interview was conducted with the councillor of Sesfontein in his office in order 
to assess legal information about particular campsites and water point regulations. This 
interview took an hour and a half. 
Informal conversations served mainly to obtain additional input for further interviews and 
to naturally gain a deeper insight in certain aspects of the water problems or conflicts. 
These conversations were carried out spontaneously while leisurely spending time in the 
village, conducting Participant Observation or with villagers who came to visit me.  
2.2.5 Conflict Mapping 
Once the problems concerning water had been 
identified through the census and the 
supplementing Semi-structured Interviews, 
the Conflict Mapping was a tool to 1) deepen 
the information about the water problems or 
conflicts and 2) to find out if these had certain 
consequences for the relationship within 
households or rather between their main 
representatives (the Heads of households) in 
the village. More precisely: with this method, 
it could be determined if the community has 
been split into certain parties due to different opinions/positions/rivalries or if alliances or 
neutral positions between certain households (or members of the same) have arisen in the 
context of the water problems or conflicts. After finding a place where the participant 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of the Conflict Mapping 
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(each Head of the household)21 felt comfortable to take part in the interview, cards 
representing each household (the names of the Heads of household were written down on 
them) were given to him. Thereupon, he was asked to organize them on a whiteboard 
according to their relation within the context of the water problems. Thus, they were told to 
keep the cards separated if they were having quarrels or different opinions or positions 
with one another or to place them together if they were “friends” in spite of the problems. 
It was also allowed to place groups of cards separated from each other to show if there 
were several groups of households sharing the same opinions or positions as others or in 
contrast to others. Each interview took approximately a half an hour. 
Figure 3 shows an example of how the method was applied. After positioning the 
cards, the participant of Okarongo was asked to explain their placing on the whiteboard. 
According to him, the household within the circle number one had different water related 
problems with each household than within the circle number two. He also explained the 
problems and the reasons for these problems. However, there were other households (circle 
number three) who had remained neutral in the conflict. They were not supporting or 
sympathising with any of the households involved in the disputes. The households in circle 
four were new in the village and therefore unaware of the problems between the mentioned 
households, according to the participant. That is why they were placed separated from the 
rest.  
Similar methods to visualize particular situations involving different actors proved 
to be very useful within the framework of research projects (see Schiffer/Hauck/Abukari/ 
(2007), where a “Net-Map” is implemented in order to explore the linkages between 
organisations within agricultural water projects. The Conflict Mapping was developed 
taking inspiration from Hübner-Schmid/ von Borries/ Hasemann/ Schnegg (2003).  
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 Except for one case: one of the oldest sons (24 years old) of a certain household was asked to participate 
instead of his father, who was absent for many days.  
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2.2.6  Wealth Ranking 
In addition to the survey, a Wealth Ranking was 
conducted in order to learn 1) what patterns of 
wealth/poverty the respondents use to classify a 
specific household as wealthy or poor and/or 
maybe socially important and 2) how many 
households are categorized as wealthy or poor. 
The Wealth Ranking allowed an identification of 
the opulent and necessitous households and 
together with the ethnographic census 
questionnaire as well as the Participant Observation method, it successively permitted a 
better understanding of the different customs of water consumption within the 
communities by giving insight into their interests or needs regarding the water resources.   
For conducting the Wealth Ranking, the Head of each household was asked to 
participate.22 The interviewees were given cards with the names of each Head of 
household. Then they were asked to order them on a white board according to their 
richness and poverty respectively. On the top of the whiteboard, the richest household 
should be placed and on the bottom the poorest while the rest of the households should be 
placed in-between according to the richness/poorness criteria. The vertical distances 
between the households represented in cards should correspond to the proportions of 
wealth differences between them. It was also allowed to place households next to one 
another (due to their economic similitude). The Wealth Ranking was then based on the 
rough estimations that every participant made in relation with the amount of animals a 
certain household owned although the exact number of animals owned by each household 
remained unknown by the respective participants. Only approximations could be made as 
to which villager owns more or less animals than other villagers. The duration of each 
interview was approximately a half an hour. 
2.2.7 Group and individual Network Analysis 
Supplementary to the Conflict Mapping, where rivalries, alliances or neutral positions 
between the representatives of the households (Heads of household and wife/wives 
respectively) should be determined, a group Network Analysis was scheduled for the 
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 Again, the same adult male (24 years old) mentioned before was our participant instead of his father.    
 
Figure 4. Carrying out the Wealth Ranking 
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project to explore the relations of social support within the framework of the water 
problems/ conflict.  
Hence, in order to not only better understand possible dependencies, but also 
cooperation, reciprocity and sympathies between the main representatives of the 
households in a holistic and systematic way, the following questionnaires were developed:  
 
(Questionnaire for the Heads of households) 
1) If you need transport to go to Sesfontein, which person in this village do you ask for a 
lift? 
2) If you are about to castrate a young bull, which person(s) in this village do you ask for 
help? 
3) Which person(s) in this village do you normally visit for a chat? 
 
(Questionnaire for the wife/wives of the respective Head of household) 
4) If you need transport to go to Sesfontein, which person in this village do you ask for a 
lift?  
5) If you are out of sugar, which person(s) in this village do you ask to give you some? 
 
During my stay in Okarongo, I recognised that its villagers had to travel to Sesfontein or 
other smaller villages for several reasons (to have their child vaccinated, to collect their 
pensions, to sell animals, to visit relatives or to buy food supplies, etc.). Sesfontein is 
located at least a one hour drive away from Okarongo and the next shop with food supplies 
is a half an hour away.  
The villagers of Okarongo have three options to reach Sesfontein or the other 
villages: 1) to walk to the main road (11km) and wait for a lift (which could take several 
days until a car with free space passes by), 2) to travel with one’s own donkey-cart or the 
donkey cart of someone else (which takes 10 hours to reach Sesfontein and four to reach 
the next shop) or 3) to ask one of the three car owners in the village for a lift. Obviously, 
the third option seems to be the most comfortable. However, it has been hypothesised that 
the third option could imply for the villagers needing to go to Sesfontein or to the next 
shop, more than a simple choice considering the characteristics of the respective car 
owners. These three persons are: a) the richest man in the community and a neutral actor in 
the conflict according to the majority of the villagers, b) a “middle-class” man stated as 
being in direct conflict with the Headman, according to several villagers or c) the 
Headman, owner of the water point and of the campsite, but stated as being ‘poor’ and 
relatively isolated in the conflict according to the Wealth Ranking and the Conflict 
Mapping. Thus, by electing the third option of asking a car owner for a lift, certain 
sympathies (or antipathies), but also dependencies could be expressed by the participants. 
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This was the main reason for inquiring after which villager is asked by the participants for 
a lift. After answering the question, the participants were asked to specify why they 
normally ask the man they mentioned in order to prove the previous assumptions.   
The second question in the questionnaire for the Heads of household was relevant 
for the sake of conducting the group Network Analysis due to the indispensability of social 
support for the realisation of this kind of activity. As livestock farming is the main 
economic labour in the area, castrating a bull is a common activity to sell animals for a 
better price. Through castration, the weight and meat quality of a young bull ameliorates. 
A young bull is a relatively big and strong animal so it is necessary for several men to hold 
it down while the castrating procedure is carried out, according to my interpreter.23 Thus, 
this question was asked with the aim of determining possible relationships of cooperation, 
reciprocity or possible dependency.  
The last question in the questionnaire for the Heads of households was aimed at 
determining the visiting habits among them, taking into account the framework of the 
water problems or conflicts. Through Participant Observation, it was assessed that the main 
representatives of some households have several socialising practices in common such as 
playing board games or cards together, occasionally eating together and also just talking 
with each other for a while. The visits described as just stopping in “for a chat” were 
assessed in order to identify relationships in which the participants approach other 
congeners spontaneously on their own accord and do so without the intention of asking for 
social or material support. This assessment was carried out in the pursuit of comparing the 
outcomes of this question with those of the Conflict Mapping and also the information 
gathered through the Semi-structured Interviews. Hence, it was pursued to identify 
symmetric or asymmetric relations, sympathies or antipathies among the main actors of the 
conflict.  
The second question in the questionnaire for the married women in the respective 
communities explored sharing structures within the villages. Sugar is one of the most 
important energy components of the diet and is used commonly to sweeten the maize 
porridge or the tea. As cooking is a common (but not an exclusively) female task in the 
villages, the women send at mealtimes the children to other households to ask for sugar if 
they are in need. Other studies in Nord-West Namibia have shown that this practice 
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 This could be confirmed personally in another visited village, where several persons (and me) had to hold a 
young bull down very tightly allowing the Head of the household (who made the decision to castrate the bull) 
to carry out the procedure without hurting the animal (or himself) unnecessarily.  
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implies a high grade of reciprocity (see for example Schnegg 2006). Besides food (maize 
meal, sugar and milk) other items such as firewood, washing powder and tobacco are 
exchanged to a lesser extent. Exploring these relationships it has been attempted to give 
insight into whether there are households excluded processes of sharing within the context 
of the water conflict and so, in turn, to gain a better understanding of its dynamics. 
Conducting each questionnaire for the group Network Analysis took approximately half an 
hour. 
In addition to the group Network Analysis, three personal Network Analyses from 
three members of the water committee were carried out in order to determine what 
connections/relations between the water committees and other persons, organisations, 
institutions or other water committees do exist. Within the framework of the water 
problems or conflicts, it was decisive to gain insight into possible extra communal relations 
in order to determine if support, advice or mediation was being given to the communities 
by external (and maybe neutral) community actors or if the villagers were “on their own“ 
with their water problems or potential conflicts. Therefore, the questions stated to the 
participants were the following: 
 
6) Do you know an organisation, an official or any other person, who you can approach 
in order to manage the water problems/conflicts existing in your village?  
7) Do you know any persons from other water committees in other villages?  
 
The implementation of this group and individual Network Analysis, in particular, the 
selection of the parameters for the analysis, was based upon the methodology proposed by 
Schnegg & Lang (2001). Conducting each questionnaire for the individual Network 
Analysis took approximately 10 minutes. 
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3 Research difficulties 
3.1 Fieldwork role and its effects on the field 
“The way in which the researchers establish themselves and their projects will 
influence the pattern of events that occur in the field, the degree of access that 
they are given, and the relationships that they establish with their informants.” 
(Burguess 1982: 15f) 
 
From the beginning, we could safely assume that our anthropological fieldwork would not 
be conducted in a situation of violence, for although disputes over water supply in other 
communities in Namibia have previously been reported (for example Hohmann 2004), 
none were of a violent nature. Moreover, Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig as well as Prof. Dr. 
Michael Schnegg – both of whom mentored the project during its preparation phase as 
Namibia specialists – reinforced that it was generally highly unlikely to find circumstances 
of violence in the region, where the research activities were to take place. However, it 
could not be completely ruled out that the conflict may turn violent during or after the 
period of fieldwork activities; that something that is not violent can still constitute a risk to 
a person; and that the act of probing into local conflicts can by itself have social impacts in 
peoples’ lives (as people may worry why these questions are being asked, what others are 
saying, etc.). Therefore, we strove to conduct the fieldwork as sensitive as possible.  
Once in the field, the situation found was in fact to be not of a violent nature, but 
some tensions in relation with water issues did exist. Therefore, measures were taken to 
prevent these latent tensions from becoming open ones. For example, compromising 
information was kept strictly discrete by conducting interviews in private places (and 
places, where the informants felt comfortable to talk), treating the personal information of 
the participants confidential and by being very careful in the formulating of questions. 
Nevertheless, it was almost inevitable that through my fieldwork role(s) and the 
relationships entered the community (if not through my mere presence) the field would 
have remained uninfluenced. A consequence of this was that the discourses in relation with 
the water conflict became more active during fieldwork and that the relative tense calm in 
the village became to some extent perturbed.24  
                                                 
 
24
 Nevertheless, this did not lead in any case to violence throughout the course of the fieldwork. If any 
personal aggressions took place in the aftermath is unlikely, as one month later after concluding the research 
activities in the setting, trustful participants declared that no incidents of a violent nature had occurred and 
that the situation in the community was similar to the previous one before my stay. 
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The first days after my arrival in Okarongo, I introduced myself to every household 
as a student interested in how the community manages the water access/supply and asked if 
there were any kind of water problems or difficulties establishing regulations in relation 
with the water administration. Often, the dialogue partners wanted to know more about the 
specific reason of my visit, for example, from where I received the money to travel from 
Germany and if something would change in their communities after having completed the 
study. To this, I responded that the fieldwork would be the basis for writing my degree 
thesis in anthropology and that a report with the fieldwork findings would be given to the 
United Nations University in Bonn. I explained that the journey was financed by these 
entities as well as the University of Cologne and Hamburg and that the equipment (tent, 
four by four vehicle, etc.) was provided by them too. To the question if something would 
change after concluding the fieldwork activities I answered that the UNU-EHS was 
planning to give the Directorate of Rural Water Supply at the Namibian Ministry of 
Agriculture Water and Forestry – which gave the correspondent permission for conducting 
the research project – a copy of the report. To this, I added that I would not have any 
influence on how these external actors might help financially or diplomatically to solve 
their water problems and that the possibility of change would rather depend on them.  
Nevertheless, my answers did lastly have a certain influence on the collected data. 
Several participants described themselves as being affected by the abuses of the Headman 
or rather because he locked the hand pump of the village. Because apparently, no 
negotiations with the Headman had been possible until then and because the intervention 
of external authorities to mediate in the water problems of the village had not been fruitful, 
they saw in me a kind of potential messenger of their complaints to very important and 
influential people.25 Several dialogue partners, for example, told me after describing to me 
indignantly and in detail the actions of the Headman that I should reproduce all what they 
had told me elaborately in my future report which I would give to the Ministry.  
In some cases, however, I got the impression that some participants even used the 
situation to exaggerate the actions of Simon, the Headman, and to reinforce their role as a 
victim within the conflict. Two Heads of household, Petrus – a joking man ending his 
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 However, this was not a general phenomenon in Okarongo. There was one household in which my 
fieldwork role had the inverse effect. The Head of this household, Afrika, was the only interviewee in 
Okarongo from which I got the impression that he was not willing to talk about the conflict in general. In 
contrast to the other households that participated in the Conflict Mapping (Jonas, Uakotora, Adult son of 
Petrus, Andreas), for example, Afrika was the only one who stated that all households are “friends” and he 
was the only one to not declare that the Headman locked the hand pump. In this case, I believe that the 
participant wanted to avoid getting involved in the conflict with his declarations about it. 
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sixties, but with a notable air of authority – and Jonas – a corpulent family man mid in his 
thirties – for example, said that every time the Headman locks the hand pump, they are 
forced to go to the natural fountains to provide water for their animals. Nevertheless, I 
found out that these participants, brought their animals (like the animals of other 
households as well) to the natural water fountains anyway, because – due to overgrazing 
problems in the immediate surroundings in the village – the animals must be brought out of 
the community area in order to graze. As my tent was situated (after we moved from 
Simon’s place; see below) ten meters away from the water point, through sporadic 
observation I noticed that Petrus’ and Jonas’ households did not bring their animals to the 
point very regularly during the time they assured me they would bring their animals to 
water (early in the mornings or in the afternoons).26 Later, moreover, once while 
accompanying their sons in their task of herding the livestock in the direction of the natural 
water fountains, they said that they (as other boys from other households) actually bring 
the animals over to the natural water fountains quite often, because the animals can drink 
and graze in the same area. Furthermore, on that occasion, they mentioned that they even 
take turns with young men of neighbored households to bring the animals over to the point; 
a method that even facilitated their labor. 
Simon, for his part, described himself as being used by his neighbours and as being 
a victim of their inconsiderate behaviour during my stay. He said that no one helped him 
with money for the maintenance of the hand pump although everybody used it and that 
unsupervised cattle had, on several occasions, destroyed the fence of the campsite he had 
constructed with great efforts. Above all, at the beginning of the fieldwork, he insisted that 
I should write in detail about the injustices of his neighbours, and on repeated occasions, 
he asked me if I could manage to get donations for him through my connections to the 
institutions/organisations I was representing.  
Besides the prior, there was another important event that influenced the situation in 
the village: Simon came to know some of the negative things the villagers were telling me 
about him. In the second household in which the ethnographic census was carried out, the 
household of Jonas, several accusations against Simon were recorded. After reviewing the 
collected data, some dates of births and family backgrounds seemed incorrect so I went 
back to Jonas the next day in order to clarify the doubts. Before beginning the interview 
with him, I noticed that the Headman’s sixteen-year-old daughter was around. As the 
                                                 
 
26
 Systematic observation at the water point has not been carried out, since it is a method that needs a great 
investment of time (cf. Beer 2003: 119-141).  
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conversation with Jonas was not about the water problems in the village, I did not insist on 
conducting the interview in a separate place (like I did the first time). After correcting the 
data, the Head of household raised his Head and while looking at the Headman’s daughter 
he said loudly the following in Damara: “[…] and just to remind you of what I said the last 
time: the Headman was not the only one who found and dig the borehole and he is not the 
real Headman of this community, the real Headmen are in Khowarib!”. With this 
affirmation, it is very probably that he wanted Simon to find out (through his daughter) 
what was being communicated during my stay in the village and that he was calling him or 
rather his discourse into question.  
Obviously, Simon found out what Jonas said about him and consequently, 
throughout the course of the research activities, the Headman began to worry more and 
more about the contents I was recording through the interviews. Understandably enough, 
even though I assured him that all names including the one of the village would be omitted 
in the report, he still worried that false information would appear about him and affirmed 
that whatever I was assessing was definitely a lie. To this, he demanded that I come to him 
before concluding the research activities, because he would give me an extensive interview 
about the truth in the community (what never happened, as I will explain later).  
In addition to the prior, although it might sound curious, the efforts of remaining a 
neutral actor in the light of the existing tensions in the research site did not necessarily 
contribute to calm the situation. In light of the tensions determined through the 
ethnographic census and the interviews, we made the decision to move from the 
Headman’s area, where we were camping.27 More and more villagers had begun asking us 
why we were camping in the Headman’s location as there were better places for us to 
camp. However, Simon took offense at our plans of moving. He thought other Heads of 
household had convinced us to leave although we underscored that we wanted to move 
because of neutrality reasons closer to the river (almost in the middle of the village, but 
still independently situated from the other households).  
                                                 
 
27
 As soon as we arrived in Okarongo and began with the research activities (18.12.08), we approached 
Simon as we thought he was the legitimate authority (more on this in section 5.5). We asked him in which 
place within the village we could erect our tents. At first, he offered us his campsite and then the shadow of a 
small tree in his area. We refused his suggestion of staying in his camping place, because in doing so, we 
would have been cut off from the daily life in the village (which would have contradicted the purpose of 
conducting Participant Observation) and because of neutrality reasons. We were concerned that the villagers 
may think that we were sympathising or siding with Simon in case of existing tensions. However, towards his 
second offer we saw ourselves under pressure to accept as it would have been impolite to refuse staying in 
the Headman’s area, according to the advice of my interpreter. However, we decided that we would stay 
under the small tree only for a short time.   
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After moving away from his area, other villagers came to our camping place in 
order to ask for cooking oil, sugar, sometimes for a lift. This did not happen while we were 
staying at Simon’s location, possibly because the other villagers did not dare to approach 
us while under the Headman’s care. I assisted the other villagers whenever I could while I 
also continued to help Simon. Nevertheless, he was annoyed because I was not exclusively 
doing favours for him.  
Throughout the course of the fieldwork, he began to see us with more mistrust, 
began to argue against other villagers more intensively and even forbid his household 
members to speak with me in his absence. Sometimes, while carrying out an interview with 
a particular Head of household, Simon’s daughters came by. Several times the 
conversation with the respective dialogue partner had to be stopped due to these visits. One 
time, an interviewee told me that the Headman was sending his family members where we 
were conducting interviews in order to spy on us and hear what the other villagers were 
saying about him. 
At the end of my stay, he even tried to blackmail me. He said, he would only 
conduct further interviews with me (inclusive the one he demanded I should do with him 
before leaving) if I called the village together and read in front of the community what 
everyone had said about him. Simon was very curious about the information I had recorded 
and wanted to know exactly who was saying what against him. I refused vehemently to call 
the inhabitants together and so, in turn, renounced a part of the Headman’s information. 
Besides the risk that the conflict could intensify through calling the village together was 
very high considering the fact that a villager had already fought with him in the past 
because of water issues, more important was for me to be absolutely discrete.  
But it is important to mention, that the Headman was not the only person who tried 
to blackmail me. During the last interview with Simon (the last day of my stay in 
Okarongo) he declared that three Heads of household (Afrika – a man ending his sixties 
giving mass every Sunday in Okarongo with an old and mended bible –, Andreas – an 
always stony-faced but communicative man beginning his forties – and Petrus) also were 
in possession of a copy of the key that opens the hand pump’s lock. Unfortunately, none of 
these three Heads of household were in the village at that time. While doing research in 
another village, I tried to reach Elizabeth, the wife of Andreas, who has a mobile phone, in 
order to ask her if her husband is truly in possession of such a key. She responded that she 
would give me the information if I provided her and her daughter a lift to the village where 
the child attends school, which is approximately a four to five hours drive (there and back). 
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Her request fairly surprised me, as she was always very cooperative to me. I am the 
opinion that demanding money or other kinds of donations/presents for information is 
legitimate, but I found her request quite exaggerated, considering that I had repeatedly 
offered her a lift to the grocery shop, her daughter to the hospital and had given her from 
my food provisions every time she needed something. Moreover, I was already carrying 
out fieldwork in another village and fulfilling her demands would have implied significant 
diesel consumption considering the limited budget. Therefore, I refused to pick her up and 
so the information could not be proved.28 Sometime later, however, I was able to ask if 
Afrika, Petrus and Andreas were in possession of a key, as Simon declared. I met them at a 
funeral in Sesfontein and asked each of them separately if they had ever heard of anyone 
else in the village having a copy of a key that opened the hand pump and all of them told 
me that the Headman was the only one in possession of such a key. 
As I have portrayed, it may be more accurate to say that the field was not only 
influenced by my fieldwork role, but also that I even became involved within the tensions 
in the community because of that role and naturally, because of the fact that the Headman 
gained partial knowledge of the information I was collecting. 
Researchers, who enter the political fabric of the communities or societies they 
study, can become unintentionally involved in their tensions in part not only due to their 
role, but sometimes even because of not choosing a side (Cohen 2000). It is difficult to 
foresee how the events would have developed in the field if I had remained in the 
Headman’s place, but I wanted to prevent any circumstances that could have symbolized 
any kind of sympathies with the one or the other party. In Okarongo, I preferred to remain 
or better to become neutral (by moving away from his area and by offering my help to 
other villagers just as I continued to offer my help to the Headman), but this was obviously 
understood by Simon as if I had chosen to be against him.29 I believe that had I not chosen 
to strive for neutrality, it would not have been – considering the fieldwork situation and my 
fieldwork role – a better option, since I felt a responsibility to represent neutrality not only 
because of the institutions/organisations I embodied, but also in order to be aware of my 
objectivity as a researcher in the research setting.  
                                                 
 
28 Similar types of demands, yet less exaggerated, were also communicated by other villagers a couple of 
times. I tried to explain to the villagers many times that I was a Colombian student in Germany having 
sometimes money shortages and that I was only a researcher doing fieldwork with a limited budget. 
Nevertheless, being “white” and the fact of coming from far away in the name of an organisation, which is 
part of the United Nations, implied for them that I had plenty of money. 
29
 Here I would like to underscore that neutrality would not have implied that I remain inactive in cases of 
physical, mental, sexual or other kinds of abuse witnessed by me (CSAA 1994). 
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3.2 Methodological difficulties 
The reconstruction of the water problems, or rather, their backgrounds and facets was not 
an easy task due to the already described fieldwork situation and it is, therefore, highly 
probable that certain information remained ‘hidden’.30 Moreover, some actors preferred to 
limit themselves to depictions of the opponent as the only blameworthy and thus, 
concealed actions that may have revealed their co-responsibility in some situations of the 
conflict.31  
These obstacles represented remarkable difficulties in finding out the ‘truth’ about 
certain issues. The evidence of certain problems relied only on the testimonies of the 
participants and they were partly very inconsistent or fragmentary. Some issues could be 
observed in the field, but not all of them, and therefore one must consider that many of the 
findings rely solely on the recorded discourses and not on documents or visually registered 
‘deeds’. In order to be able to make a statement as substantiated as possible, attempts were 
made to proof some assertions of a particular participant by interviewing other actors to see 
if their answers coincided. 
As mentioned above, I have strived to be very careful in asking questions in order 
to prevent raising the tensions in the village. This proved to not be an easy task in some 
cases. In Okarongo, for example, some villagers told me that the Headman locked the hand 
pump, but I was not able to ask Simon directly why he was doing this because he would 
have tried to find out who told me. This could have produced (more) mistrust between the 
villagers so instead I asked him what the welded eyelets on the hand pump were for. To 
this question, he answered in fact that he had put them there in order to lock the hand 
pump, but the reason why he closes it was another one (see section 7). 
Concerning the ethnographic census, only one noteworthy difficulty arose. As not 
every household member is in possession of an identification card, many birth dates had to 
be stated on the basis of estimation. For this reason, the univariate analysis of age of the 
village population cannot be considered precisely correct. 
To conclude this section, it is important to mention again that the time framework 
for conducting the research activities was rather limited. In order to implement the 
                                                 
 
30
 In anthropology, it is well known that some fieldwork roles can facilitate, but also impede access to 
different types of information (Snow/ Benford/ Anderson 1986). 
31
 In Okarongo, for example, some villagers concealed that their animals had destroyed some objects in the 
Headman’s campsite and that they subsequently, did not give him any compensation for the damages – a 
reason why Simon was said by other participants, to have locked the hand pump. The concerned villagers 
accused him vehemently that he denied them the access to water mentioning, however, other reasons for it. 
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prepared methods and gain a general understanding of the water conflict in the village, 
time was an important factor in finding the adequate place for the correspondent 
interviews. The participants were not always available because they did not have time (or 
interest) or because they were out of the community. In Okarongo, for example, two Heads 
of household (Uakotora – a serene man labelled as the “richest” in Okarongo and Petrus), 
in particular, were only in the settlement two times for two to three days during my stay 
and the Headman was absent for almost two weeks. When these men were in the village, 
they were always quite busy and although their involvement in the conflict was important, 
only short interviews could be conducted with them. 
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4 Gathered data and characteristics of the informants 
4.1 List of the gathered data  
Altogether, the following data was collected in the research setting: 
 8 Ethnographic Census with 46 questions each.  
 7 conducted Wealth Rankings (the Headman reserved his right not to participate).   
 Group Network Analysis between all Heads of households (3 questions) and adult 
women (wives) (2 questions) in the village.   
 Individual Network Analysis with 3 members of the water committee (1 question 
each). 
 4 focused interviews with members of the water committee.  
 5 interviews using the Conflict Mapping (the Headman reserved his right not to 
participate and two Heads of household were new in the village and declared not 
knowing anything about the conflict).  
 1 interview with a governmental official in Sesfontein.  
 Several field notes (on the basis of informal conversations with the villagers and 
Participant Observation).  
4.2 The informants 
A majority of the participants are Heads of household and their respective wives in 
Okarongo. Table 1 gives an overview of the participants according to their age, occupation 
and – if applicable – special function in the community.32  
 
 
Fictitious Name Age Occupation Special function in the village 
Afrika  (Head of HH) 69 Farming Priest 
Joan  (Wife of Head) 67 Farming Treasurer in the WC 
Adam  (Grandson of Head) 31 Tracking for NGO/ Farming - 
Jonas (Head of HH) 34 Tracking for NGO/ Farming - 
Emma (Wife of Head) 26 Farming - 
Simon (Head of HH) 58 Farming/Campsite Manager Headman 
Ngunoe (Wife of Head) 48 Farming (Treasurer in the WC)* 
Naipera (Daughter of Head) 28 Farming Secretary of the WC 
Uakotora (Head of HH) 68 Farming Treasurer in the WC 
Aline (1st Wife of Head) 45 Farming - 
Naipera (2nd Wife of Head) 28 Farming - 
Mamikie (Sister of Head) 45 Farming - 
Petrus (Head of HH) 68 Farming - 
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 As noted above, apart from the community members of Okarongo, an interview with a governmental 
official in Sesfontein was carried out. His specific position will not be supplied here in order to protect his 
identity.  
Table 1. General characteristics of the participants 
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Table 1. (continued) 
Fictitious Name Age Occupation Special function in the village 
Presilla (1st Wife of Head) 64 Farming - 
Brenda (2nd Wife of Head) 29 Farming - 
Usia (Son of Head) 23 Tracking for NGO/ Farming Secretary of the WC 
Rio (Son of Head) 29 Farming - 
Andreas (Head of HH) 42 Tracking for NGO/ Farming First representative of the NGO in the village 
Elizabeth (Wife of Head) 39 Secr. of the NGO/ Farming - 
Sofia (Daughter of Head) 21 Farming Organizer of the WC 
Mutoto (Head of HH) 46 Farming - 
Magdalena (Wife of Head) 27 Farming - 
Josef (Head of HH) 46 Tracking for NGO/ Farming - 
Magrieta (Wife of Head) 31 Farming - 
* The exercise of this position was controversial  
 
Apart from the participants depicted above, other persons also voluntarily supplied 
information within the framework of informal and brief conversations while conducting 
Participant Observation.33 All of these persons are adult sons and daughters of the 
respective household’s representatives.  
 
                                                 
 
33
 Most of these conversations simply belong to the stationary ethnographic research on site.  
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5 Description of the research setting 
5.1 Population numbers and sex composition 
As noted in the section 2.2.2, the aim of the Ethnographic Census questionnaire was to 
register both the population permanently living in the village (the “de facto” population) 
and the persons considered to be household members even though they are living outside 
the community temporarily or for an indeterminate period of time including schoolchildren 
(the “de jure” population). Table 2 shows the amounts and percentages of persons 
registered through the census in Okarongo. 
 
 
Total of persons registered 110 (8 Households) 
Living permanently in the community 79 (71,81%) 38 Women  (48,10%) 
41 Men  (51,90%) 
Living permanently outside the community 12 (10,1%) 
3 Women  (25%) 
3 Men  (25%) 
5 Women  (41,6%) 
1 Man  (8,3%) 
Children schooling 19 (17,27%) 7 Girls  (36,8%) 
12 Boys  (63,15%) 
 
In Okarongo, 110 persons were registered through the census carried out in the eight 
households of the community. From them, 79 (71,81%) live permanently in the village, 12 
(10,1%) live permanently outside the community and 19 (17,27%) children are attending 
school outside the village. Altogether, the persons living permanently in the setting 
constitute 38 women (48,10%) and 41 men (51,90%). Thus, the gender proportion is not 
very dissimilar.   
The adult persons living outside the village can be divided into two categories: 
household members that did not come to settle in the respective communities with the 
registered households and household members that emigrated after having lived in the 
village for an indefinite period of time. The persons who did not settle in the village, but 
who still are considered to be household members include four individuals above the age 
of 65 (3 women/1 men) and two individuals in their early 30’s (2 men). The older persons 
are relatives living in the village from which certain villagers (Simon and Andreas) came 
from originally before settling in Okarongo. The two younger men (all sons from Simon) 
went to another town looking for work before settling in Okarongo. The persons who had 
migrated away from the community include individuals of varying ages (20, 28, 48 and 57 
Table 2. Amounts and percentages of individuals registered through the census 
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respectively). Three of them migrated to larger towns looking for a living and one of whom 
(a 28 year old woman) resides in another location in order to look after cattle belonging to 
her household (Uakorora’s HH). From the 19 children attending to school, 12 of them were 
boys and 7 of them girls. In Namibia, school attendance is compulsory from the age of six 
to the age of sixteen when the 10th grade of basic education is normally reached. Selective 
courses based on learner-centred strategies for grade 11-12 can be visited on a voluntary 
basis when the children successfully complete the 10th grade. In Okarongo 14 children (5 
girls/9 boys) of school age (between 6 and 16 years old) respectively were not attending 
school at the time of the census. The schoolchildren used to visit their respective 
households during the school vacations (from the 4th December until the 14th January, from 
the 29th April until the 26th May and from 25th August until the 8th September). The “de 
jure” members who migrated from Okarongo visit the community very rarely.  
5.2 Population structure  
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the population 
recorded through the census in age groups for 
Okarongo. The categories are distributed in ranges 
from 0 to 4, from 5 to 9, 10 to 14 and so on. The age 
category with the highest value is 0 to 4. That makes a 
total of 20 children below the age of five years. There 
were no persons recorded between the ages of 50 and 
54 and between 70 and 79. The oldest individual 
registered was a 104 year old woman. The most 
notable differences in terms of gender within age 
groups can be observed for the categories 5 to 9, 10 to 
14 were more men than women were registered, and 
the categories 25 to 29 and 45 to 49 were more women 
than men have been recorded.   
Figure 5 (see below) visualizes the population 
structure of the research setting showing the 
percentages for both sexes. At the time of the census, the average of all age statements in 
Okarongo was approximately 23 years. The average’s standard deviation amount was 
approximately 20,5 and the median of the population’s age 17. 
Table 3. Population distributed in 
age groups 
Age group Female Male Total 
0 9 11 20 
5 5 10 15 
10 3 7 10 
15 8 7 15 
20 4 7 11 
25 7 3 10 
30 1 5 6 
35 3 1 4 
40 0 1 1 
45 4 1 5 
50 0 0 0 
55 1 2 3 
60 1 0 1 
65 4 3 7 
70 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 
80 1 0 1 
85 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 
95 0 0 0 
100 1 0 1 
Total 52 58 110 
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5.3 HH sizes and ethnic composition 
Through the Ethnographic Census carried out in the community, altogether three different 
ethnic groups were registered: Herero, Himba and Damara. At the time of the census, there 
were three Herero, two Damara, one Himba and two Damara/Herero households. At this, 
the Herero people constitute the majority of the population with 49 individuals (44,55%), 
the second largest group is the Damara with 38 (34,55%), and the Himba with 23 persons 
(20,91%) are in Table 4 the minority. In the two mixed households, both Heads married a 
Damara woman respectively. Table 4 shows the ethnic groups and their distribution in 
households for the community considering the members permanently living in the village, 
the schoolchildren and the persons living outside the settlement.  
HH from Ethnic group Living permanently 
 in the village School. Ch. 
Living permanently  
outside the village Total 
Afrika Damara 5 3 1 9 
Jonas Damara/Herero 7 3 0 10 
Simon Damara/Herero 10 3 7 20 
Uakotora Herero 14 7 2 23 
Petrus Himba 23 0 0 23 
Mutoto Herero 2 0 0 2 
Josef Herero 9 0 0 9 
Total: 79 19 12 110 
 
 
Table 4. Ethnic groups and their distribution in HHs considering their members permanently living 
in the village, the schoolchildren and the persons living outside Okarongo 
 
Figure 5. Population pyramid for Okarongo 
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Considering the information depicted in the table, the following aspects can be 
underscored for the research setting: 
 At the time of the census, the maximum amount of individuals per household with 
permanent residence was 23 (Petrus HH). The minimum amount of individuals per 
household with permanent residence in the community were two (Mutoto’s household 
and Simon’s household, the two newcomers in Okarongo).  
 The average amount of individuals per household with permanent residence in the 
respective was 9,875 (standard deviation: 5,97). The maximum number of individuals 
belonging to a household living outside the community was seven (from Simon’s 
household). 
 The maximum number of children attending school belonging to a same household 
was seven (Ukotora’s household).  
 
The members of the households with permanent residence in the community sleep in 
grouped huts – what several of them termed – a farm or homestead. The structure of the 
huts is made of thin trunks and the walls are made with a mixture of cattle dung, ash and 
sand. The homesteads are also including one kraal for the cattle and one kraal for the goats 
and sheep. The areas where the huts and kraals are located are not clearly separated. For 
some Herero households, the locations of the huts and kraals within the homestead have a 
cosmological relevance, like for example the lifeline between the main hut and the cattle 
kraal. Passing through this sacred space is taboo for non-household members (for elaborate 
descriptions of the Herero cosmology in this context as well as in a more general one, see 
Röhreke 2001).  
5.4 Settlement years of the HHs and their reasons for migrating to the 
community 
Table 5 shows the years in which the households assessed through the census arrived in the 
respective communities together with the corresponding reasons for their migration. 
 
HH from Year of arrival in Okarongo Main reason for migrating to Okarongo 
Afrika 1999 Looking for grazing areas. 
Jonas 2005 Because of the work at the NGO on site.  
Simon 1992 Looking for grazing areas. 
Uakotora 1999 Looking for grazing areas.  
Petrus 1987 Looking for grazing areas. 
Andreas 2003 Because of the work at the NGO on site.  
Mutoto 2008 (July) Because of the work at the NGO on site.  
Josef 2008 (April) Looking for grazing areas. 
Table 5. HHs’ year of arrival in Okarongo and the main reason for their settlement 
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The information about the settling years in the community does not correspond necessarily 
to the years in which the village was established. According to participants, the area had 
been inhabited a long time before the household constellations were registered by the 
census. Thus, at the time of the census, the longest length of time spent by any household 
in Okarongo was 21 years (Petrus household). The two newest households settled a few 
months before the research activities began (Mutoto’s and Josef’s households). On 
average, a household in Okarongo has spent 7,87 years residing in the community 
(standard deviation: 7,04339229).  
Before the households settled in the village, all of them came from different areas 
of the Kunene region. A relative common reason for migrating to the village was the 
search of grazing areas. This was the reason for the migration of five households in 
Okarongo (Afrika’s, Simon’s, Uakotora’s, Petrus’ and Josef’s households respectively). 
According to the respective Heads of households, there were overgrazing problems in the 
villages where they had previously resided. Due to work reasons altogether three 
households (Jonas’, Andreas’ and Mutoto’s households respectively) settled in Okarongo. 
They are employees of an NGO operating in several countries of the South African region 
in the field of wild animal conservation.34 Before the NGO settled in the community, they 
and their households were living in another village where the organisation has a base. The 
NGO came to the settlement in 2003, because it is closer to the animals which are being 
monitored by the organization. 
5.5 Political organisation  
The Namibian Constitution acknowledges the existence of two parallel law systems: the 
common law and the customary law system (Article 66). In the region of Sesfontein, 
besides the regional councillor, who is a representative of a political party and is elected 
according to the Namibian legislation, there are traditional authorities like Chiefs and 
Headmen acknowledged by the The Traditional Authorities Act of 200035. The Act 
provides guidelines for the designation, election and recognition of traditional leaders 
defining their powers, duties and functions among others. However, the Act refers to the 
supreme leader of a community as its chief and to the leaders under his authority as senior 
traditional councillors or traditional councillors (Article 10). The title of chief is in fact 
                                                 
 
34
 The name of the NGO and its specific activity will be omitted in this work in order to ensure the 
anonymity of both the NGO and the villagers working for it.   
35
 This Act of 2000 repealed further Acts concerning the legislation of traditional authorities such as the 
Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 and the Traditional Authorities Amendment Act of 1997. 
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used, but is not very common among traditional authorities; they prefer traditional titles. In 
contrast, the designation of senior traditional councillors or traditional councillors are not 
at all used in daily life, but they correspond to the title of senior Headman or Headman, 
which is the common denomination in the area of research. Both, the election or 
appointment of the Chiefs as well as the senior traditional leaders and traditional leaders 
according to the Act, proceeds in accordance with the customary law of the community 
they lead (Article 4). According to the legislation, the Chief’s functions are related to the 
administration of the customary law and cultural matters, but also to ensure that natural 
resources are used on a sustainable basis. The Act requires that Traditional Authorities and 
their communities should engage in environmental planning to define successes and 
solutions to environmental issues including any underlying minerals resources. (Article 3)  
The senior traditional councillors’ and the traditional councillors’ functions are to assist the 
Chief in the performance of his functions  and to exercise or perform such other powers, 
duties or functions as may be delegated or assigned to any of them by the Chief (Article 10 
a,b). At this, however, they are clearly subordinated to governmental institutions and 
regional councils (Article 16). 
In Okarongo, there are some discrepancies concerning the person who lays claim to 
be the ruler of the community. As mentioned above, upon first arriving in Okarongo, I 
introduced myself to Simon who represented himself as the Headman of the community. 
He supposedly holds this position, because he was the first to settle in the area and because 
everyone comes to him when asking for solutions for different problems. Nevertheless, the 
information gathered through the census points to another household (Petrus household) 
having settled in the village before him (see above). Furthermore, three Heads of 
household (Jonas, Petrus and Andreas) assured me that there were people living in the area 
before Simon came, but that they had moved away a long time ago.36 More important is 
that at least four Heads of household (Jonas, Uakotora, Petrus and Andreas) declared, that 
Simon was not the real leader of the community. Besides the legal statements of the 
Traditional Authorities Act of 2000 presented above, they said that the community had not 
elected him to the office of Headman and that the village was under the direct jurisdiction 
of a Damara chief settled in an area approximately 30 km away. Moreover, Uakotora and 
                                                 
 
36
 Andreas even saw Simon as a kind of intruder in the community. Andreas, who denominated himself as a 
Damara, said that the presumed Headman (which denominated himself as a Herero) was not from the area 
and that he had come in a customary Damara territory (Damaraland). 
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Petrus demanded that I should not refer to Simon as the Headman, because he was only a 
common villager.37  
According to these informants, Simon proclaimed himself being the Headman without 
having been legitimately elected by the villagers. It remains unclear why he calls himself 
the Headman and in what situations he refers to himself as such. It is possible, however, 
that he does so in pursuit of giving his actions within the water conflict some kind of 
legitimization. For, the position of the Headman, affords certain entitlements otherwise not 
permitted to common villagers, like forbidding people to come to the water point or 
locking the hand pump. Nevertheless, the findings do not indicate that he held a distinct 
advantage in the water conflict through declaring himself as such. As is shown later, the 
fact that Simon refers to himself as the Headman does not have an impediment on the 
villagers taking actions against his arbitrary acts. Surely, this may be because the villagers 
were aware of their right of electing their own authorities and that Simon was therefore a 
kind of impostor. It is also possible that the reason why he attributes the Headman title to 
himself has nothing to do with the water conflict at all. It cannot be ruled out, for example, 
that he was calling himself such in pursuit of status, recognition or inclusive only for 
vanity. 
5.6 General economic aspects  
5.6.1 HH income strategies 
Similar to other parts of rural Northwest Namibia (cf. Schnegg 2009), the households in 
the research setting have other income strategies besides livestock farming (or rather the 
sale of animals). Regular working salaries and state pensions are relatively important forms 
of income in the community as well. Remittances, occasional jobs or other kinds of 
activities play a secondary role, as can be seen in Table 6:  
 
 
Forms of income and amounts 
HH 
from 
amounts 
received 
through the 
sale of 
animals (last 
month) 
reg. 
working   
salaries 
(monthly) 
state 
pensions 
(monthly) 
remittances (last month) 
occasional 
jobs/ 
other 
activities 
(last month) 
Total 
Afrika - 
1 x 1200 
N$ 
1 x 650 N$ 
3 x 450 
N$ 
(fruits or vegetables 
 only irregularly) - 3200 N$ 
                                                 
 
37
 In this paper, however, I do refer to him as the Headman in order to make him – as central figure in the 
conflict in Okarongo – easier to identify in the description and analysis of the conflict.   
Table 6. Forms of income and amounts in Okarongo  
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Forms of income and amounts 
HH 
from 
amounts 
received 
through the 
sale of 
animals (last 
month) 
reg. 
working   
salaries 
(monthly) 
state 
pensions 
(monthly) 
remittances (last month) 
occasional 
jobs/ 
other 
activities 
(last month) 
Total 
Simon 2560 N$ (7 goats) - 
1 x 450 
N$ 
(money (amount unknown), 
clothes, fruits and/ or 
vegetables only irregularly) 
500 N$ 
(borrowed) 
+ 100 N$ 
(selling 
tobacco) 
3610 N$ 
Uakotora 
5000N$ 
(2 cows)  
300 N$ 
(2 goats) 
- - - - 5300 N$ 
Petrus - 1 x 700 N$ 2 x 450 N$ -  - 1600 N$ 
Andreas 600 N$ (2 goats) 
1 x 700 N$ 
1 x 400 N$ 450 N$ - 
 150 N$  
(baby-
sitting) 
2300 N$ 
Mutoto 200 N$ (1 goat) 1 x 600 N$ - -  - 800 N$ 
Josef 200 N$ (1 goat) - - -  - 200 N$ 
 
5.6.1.1 The sale of animals 
In the research site, the animals (above all cattle, goats and sheep) constitute – in terms of 
Bourdieu (1983) – the villagers` financial capital.38 The number of animals sold by an 
individual household depends on the respective day-to-day necessities of that household, 
on the amounts of other income strategies (when existent) and if money is urgently needed 
for purposes besides the regular household supplies. This makes an estimation of the 
monthly household income in the community very difficult; the time pattern of one month 
– namely one month before the correspondent interview – served only as a reference for 
sampling the sale of animals within a set period of time in order to gain at least an 
impression of the significance of the money incomes through this activity. A systematic 
day-to-day assessment of household consumption patterns would have been impossible to 
achieve during the research activities, as such a procedure would have implied 
methodological, logistical and financial aspects (see for example Pröpper 2009) not 
foreseen within the time and budget frameworks of the research project.  
                                                 
 
38
 Donkeys and horses constitute for the villagers rather a physical capital in terms of Coleman (1983). The 
ownership of these animals facilitates mobility and transport. In the research setting, the donkeys (with the 
help of a donkey cart) are used for transporting wood, for travelling to the next town, for shopping or for 
bringing water. 
Table 6. (continued) 
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The household of Petrus is a good example of why the information about the 
animals’ sales should be read carefully. This household is the largest household in 
Okarongo, but it did not sale any animals the month before the interview. According to 
Petrus, he still had money from the sale of a cow some time ago. (The only household that 
declared explicitly not to sell animals was Afrika). This household receives money mostly 
through working salaries and state pensions. It is one of the smallest in terms of the 
number of members. An absolute independency on the income generated through the sale 
of animals was, however, difficult to imagine considering principally the employment 
circumstances in the villages (see below) and the few possibilities available for finding a 
job in the region. The official unemployment rate within the Sesfontein Constituency 
amounts to 20% for men and 34% for women, not taking into account the numbers of 
working hours or underemployment (cf. Republic of Namibia 2001: 29). 
The money obtained from a selling action can last for several weeks, for instance 
the declaration of Petrus. The most common items purchased with this money (together 
with the money from the working salaries and state pensions if applicable) are basic 
consumption objects like corn meal, tea, bread, toiletries, cooking oil, sugar, soap for 
washing clothes, and/or tobacco. In some cases, parts of the money acquired also goes for 
supporting household members living outside the community. In cases when food is 
urgently needed and no purchaser can be found, the villagers also exchange animals 
(commonly a goat) for several tens of kilograms of corn meal, for example.  
In the research site, animals have been sold for several urgent causes besides the 
household supply. In Okarongo, for example, Simon and Andreas declared explicitly 
having sold some animals principally, because they needed money for paying the 
forthcoming school expenditures in January. School fees amount approximately 1,200 N$ 
yearly (400 N$ per child for one trimester). In addition, school uniforms and other studying 
material such as books, notebooks, pencils etc. must also be afforded. Uakotora sold some 
animals, because he needed money in order to be able to attend a funeral and to visit a sick 
relative; both in different towns several hours drive away from the village. 
Even if animals are not being sold regularly, they still play another important role: 
the meat of the animals constituted an important source of proteins in the villagers’ 
alimentation. The nutrition in both communities is relatively monotonous. This is mainly 
due to financial reasons. According to the participants, they are only able to eat corn meal 
porridge, milk, bread and tea. Canned food such as pilchards, beef, sausages, fruits or 
vegetables are rarely purchased (fresh vegetables, fruits or meat are not available in the 
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shops of the respective communities). If a certain household does not sell its animals 
regularly, a goat or a sheep is slaughtered at least occasionally for household 
consumption.39 
5.6.1.2 Regular working salaries 
It is common for the money from a working salary (also the money acquired through the 
state pensions) to be shared amongst household members. From the “de facto” population 
in Okarongo, only eight villagers (2 women and 6 men) earn a regular working salary (this 
makes 14,81% of the whole labour force of the registered population living permanently in 
the village between 16 and 60 years). Seven of them constitute the staff of the NGO’s base 
in the community and one individual (one of the women) works in another bigger section 
situated in another community. She is classified as a commuter since she declared herself 
to be living permanently in Okarongo and travelling to her household from her working 
place whenever possible. At the time of the census, the highest income in the village was 
1,200 N$ (earned by the commuter) and the lowest 400 N$ (earned by the second woman, 
the wife of Andreas). Both were working as a cook and radio operator respectively. The 
men (Andreas, Jonas, Mutoto, one of Petru’s sons and one of Afrika’s grandsons), worked 
as animals trackers and earned between 600 and 700 N$ at the time of the census. The 
average income recorded was 618,75N$ (standard deviation: 224,290264). No member of 
Simon’s, Uakotora’s and Josef’s households was having a paying occupation (compare 
with Table 6).  
5.6.1.3 State pensions 
In Namibia, an Old Age Pension (OAP) is paid to everyone who reaches 60 years of age 
irrespective of past and current employment status and income as long as the person is a 
Namibian citizen or a permanent resident in Namibia. The pension has a monthly value of 
450 N$. (Levine/ van der Berg/ Yu 2009: 6) From all individuals registered through the 
census living permanently in Okarongo, altogether six persons (4 women, 2 men) receive 
an OAP. Only one person (one of Afrika’s grandsons) receives a Disability Pension (DP), 
which has the same value as the OAP and is paid to those persons from the age of 16 on, 
who have been diagnosed by a state doctor as being temporarily or permanently disabled 
(ibid.).40  
                                                 
 
39
 The cows are slaughtered principally at important events such as funerals or marriages.  
40
 The person in mention is a 20–year-old man, who is mentally handicapped.  
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5.6.1.4 Remittances 
Remittances play a secondary role as an income strategy in Okarongo. Altogether two 
households receive some kind of support from household members living outside of the 
community (Afrika’s and Simon’s respectively; compare Table 6). However, this does not 
occur on a regular basis in any of the cases. The correspondent household members send 
food (vegetables, fruits, corn meal), money and/or clothes.  
In the research setting, there are households that, in turn, support some of their 
members living outside the community. This is the case in three households (Simon’s, 
Uakotora’s and Andreas’) in Okarongo. Simon the Headman, for example, supports two of 
its seven “de jure” household members (his mother 65 and grandmother 104 years old 
respectively). Apart from sending some tobacco, he also sporadically sends some money 
when animals have recently been sold. This is done as well by the other households.41 
5.6.1.5 Occasional jobs and other activities 
Finally, occasional jobs and/or other kinds of income generating activities are almost non-
existent in Okarongo. Borrowing money, for example, is a seldom practice. All 
respondents answered negatively to the question when asked if they generally borrow 
monetary funds. Only Simon declared that he had borrowed money (500 N$) from a friend 
living outside the community.  
He was also the only person to declare having sold home-grown objects. This is due 
to the general seldom practice of cultivating gardens in the community (hereto more 
lately). The Headman occasionally gives tobacco to his grandmother and mother, who live 
in another village, for the purpose of selling. In exchange, he then receives a part of the 
earnings. A month before the interview, Simon earned 100 N$ through this activity.   
The only person who was carrying out an occasional job at the time of the census 
was one of Andreas’ daughters. She helped to take care of the children in Jonas’ household 
and earned 150 N$.  
5.6.1.6 Subsistence agriculture 
The cultivation of gardens is a very limited practice in Okarongo. The only person 
cultivating a garden was Simon. The garden is located in the campsite and it is irrigated by 
transporting 25-liter containers by car from the water point. For this reason, the Headman 
said he is only able to cultivate a small part of it primarily for his own subsistence. He used 
                                                 
 
41
 Uakotora supports only two de jure household members (his 2nd wife and one of his daughters) as well as 
Petrus (his parents). 
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to cultivate pumpkins, carrots, tobacco, papaya, tomatoes, watermelons, sweet potatoes and 
cabbage. However, he has lately only cultivated tobacco due to the high cost of gasoline 
for the car. Other households of Okarongo (all except for Mutoto’s and Josef’s) have 
gardens in other communities. They also are not actively cultivated due to water scarcity 
and irrigation problems in the sites where they are located.  
5.6.2 Division of labour 
In the researched community, those individuals without employment dedicated their time 
to farming activities irrespective of their gender. However, some domestic tasks are usually 
carried out by the women, for example, milking cows and goats (often two times daily), 
collecting firewood for cooking (as necessary), cooking and taking care of children. If time 
allows they also seam clothing, make butter, visit other women or just have a siesta. 
Concerning water issues, the women are usually the ones to fetch the drinking water for the 
household. The Heads of households and young men (inclusive those which don’t attend to 
school), on the other hand, are usually the ones to bring the cattle and goats to graze and to 
drink water at natural water fountains or at the water point. It is also the task of men – as 
already mentioned – to castrate the male animals when necessary or to slaughter a cow or 
goat in the framework of a funeral or marriage or just at home. Specifically the Heads of 
household are usually the ones to conduct the trading activities of the livestock. The prices 
for the animals are usually negotiated between the owner and the purchaser and depend 
mostly on the size and health of the animal in question. 
To a relatively equal degree, men and women carry out the task of separating small 
animals from the milking cows along with the goats and sheep from the cattle at the 
household’s kraal. If the children are on holiday from school, they usually help with 
collecting firewood, bringing the goats to graze and fetching water for their households.  
5.6.3 Results of the Wealth Ranking 
The common criteria used by the participants to classify a person in their respective 
community as wealthy or poor is based on the number of livestock the person in mention 
owns. Specifically, the number of cattle is attached an additional importance, because apart 
from their higher value, they also confer prestige on the owner. Although working salaries 
or state pensions are an important means of income for certain households, they are not 
seen as a determining criteria for the rank of a person as wealthy or impoverished.  
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Figure 6 shows spatially how the participants of the Wealth Ranking positioned the 
households represented in cards over the board.42  
 
Figure 6. Joined results of the Wealth Ranking  in Okarongo 
 
As mentioned in the applied methods section, the vertical distances between the 
households correspond to the proportions of wealth differences between the households. 
According to the figure, the household commonly perceived as the richest in the 
community was Uakotora’s, followed by Petrus’ household.43 Afrika’s household, in 
contrast, is perceived clearly as the poorest household in the settlement. Jonas’ household 
is perceived to be wealthier than Afrika’s household, and Simon’s household is perceived 
to be similarly wealthy as Afrika’s household, however, these two are still considered to be 
poor. Andreas’ household, Mutoto’s household and Josef’s household are positioned in-
between these extremes and are perceived as being equal in wealth. These three households 
are considered neither rich nor poor.  
The participants’ estimations depicted in the image coincide approximately with the 
number of animals, which were assessed through the Ethnographic Census questionnaire 
                                                 
 
42 This method involved giving the interviewees cards with the names of each Head of household so they 
could identify the households and rank them during the interview. The outcomes of each separated interview 
were digitalized with a graphic program and put over different planes. Figure 6 shows these planes grouped 
on each other. 
43
 In Figure 6, it can be observed that Petrus’ household was perceived as poor by one participant. This 
participant was the oldest son of the Petrus. For him the number of animals was not necessarily a criterion of 
prosperity. He perceived his household as “poor”, since there were too many children and few persons having 
a working salary, so his own declaration. The “richest” household for him was Andreas’ instead, a household 
where two persons were having a wage.    
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for every household.44 Uakotora’s household, the richest in the community according to 
Figure 6, owns more animals than the others, especially in relation with the number of 
cattle and goats. Afrikas’ household, the poorest in the community, does not own any cattle 
and has fewer animals than his neighbours (see Table 7). 
 
Wealth Ranking Position 
(HH from) 
Number of animals assessed through the census 
Total 
Cattle Goats Sheep Donkeys Horses 
 Uakotora (“richest”) 26 63 11 0 0 100 
Petrus (“2nd richest”) 18 14 10 2 2 46 
Andreas, Mutoto, Josef (“average”) 6 , 7, 9 30, 23, 40 6, 11, 7 3, 4, 7 1, 0, 0 76, 45, 73 
Jonas, Simon (“poor”) 10, 3 26, 23 2, 9 4, 5 0 42, 45 
 Afrika (“poorest”) 0 29 0 7 0 36 
 
                                                 
 
44
 The participants could only rank their neighbors based on visual estimations. Rough number appraisals, 
however, could not be carried out by the interviewees.  
Table 7. Ranking positions vs. number of animals assessed through the census 
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6 General water issues 
6.1 Infrastructure 
At the time of the research activities in Okarongo, there were two water points with a 
respective hand pump installed. The hand pumps were donated by a humanitarian 
organisation in mid-2005 and at the end of 2006. The water points were constructed where 
open water holes had formerly been dug by some members of the community. The water 
point, which was finished in mid-2005 (“W.P.1” in Figure 7 below), was having problems 
since 2007. According to the villagers, it was not the hand pump itself, but rather 
something in the underground, which blocked the water from being pumped up. However, 
water could be fetched by pulling it up through a hole in the cement basis using a bucket 
tied to a rope. The water in this hole was, however, not very clean as the hole remained 
open. Thus, the water point having been used by the community was the one that Simon 
affirms to be his own (“W.P.2” in Figure 7 below).  
This water point was commonly used for fetching water for human consumption 
and for several household activities. The water point also had a canal where water can be 
pumped up for the animals. Nevertheless, some households frequently brought their 
livestock (mostly their cattle, goats and sheep) to natural water fountains surrounding the 
community (located approximately 1,5 km and 2,5 km away respectively). This occurs not 
necessarily to avoid conflict with Simon (like some villagers suggested), but rather 
principally because they have to graze outside the village grounds anyway due to 
overgrazing problems in the community area.45 The natural water fountain located ca. 
1,5km away (“Nat. W.P.1” in Figure 7 below) is an enclosed basin between two mountains 
in which water rain accumulates. It is mainly used for the sheep and goats. In contrast, at 
the second natural water point (“Nat. W.P.2” in the same figure), water flows from down 
below up to the surface forming a small stream with small basins (2 m2 to 4 m2); this 
natural water spring is mainly used for watering the cattle.46 
                                                 
 
45
 The villagers, who own donkeys, do not bring the animals in mention to the natural water fountains. The 
animals normally walk around the village and go to the water point to drink on their own. Anyone who goes 
to fetch water or passes by at the water point, usually pumps some water for them if they are standing at it.  
46
 The water points in the village have not been depicted in Figure 7, in order to keep the research setting 
unidentifiable. 
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6.2 Usage 
6.2.1 Human consumption 
In Table 8 the water fetching patterns of the community according to the declarations of 
the participants are depicted. 
 
 
Figure 7. Map of Okarongo and location of natural water fountains 
Table 8. Water fetching patterns in Okarongo 
HH  
from 
No. of 
members  
living 
permanently  
in the com. 
Person who  
fetches water  
(rel. to the  
Head of HH) 
Age Mean of  fetching water 
Amount of  
water fetched 
Frequency of  
fetching water 
Afrika 5 Wife Grandson 
67 
31 
By foot 
Donkey-cart 
25 liter 
200 to 300 liter 
2 x day 
Only if not 
working 
Jonas 7 Wife 26 By foot 25 liter 2 x day 
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One can estimate that almost every household in Okarongo consumes approximately 50 
liters of water daily. The largest households in the community consume approximately 75 
liters. The water is used for drinking, cooking, washing pots and for personal hygiene. For 
showers the villagers fetch extra water. In Okarongo, the water is commonly fetched by the 
wives of the Heads of household and their children, mostly in the larger households. The 
women carry a 25 liter container on top of their heads and the children carry smaller 
recipients with their arms. If men go to fetch water (this occurs on an irregular basis), they 
use donkey-carts for that purpose.  
6.2.2 Animal consumption 
Surely, the most quantity of water is needed for the livestock, above all the cattle. The 
amount of water a cow drinks depends on the size and milk yield, quantity of dry matter 
consumed, temperature and relative humidity of the environment, temperature of the water, 
quality and availability of the water, and amount of moisture in the feed (Looper/ Waldner 
2007). Considering the temperature in the region during the research activities (between 
25° C and 30°C approximately), an adult cow can consume between 90 and 135 Liters of 
water per day. Weaned dairy heifers consume approximately 3,5 to 5,5 Liters of water per 
100 pounds of body weight (they can weigh up to 1200 lbs.) (ibid.). Depending on the size 
and weight, an adult goat requires 2 to 3 liters, a sheep 3 to 5 liters, and donkeys and horses 
18 to 35 liters. This means that the more animals a person owns, the more water this 
individual needs in order to support his animals. In other words, the richer a person is 
Table 8. (continued) 
HH  
from 
No. of 
members  
living 
permanently  
in the com. 
Person who  
fetches water  
(rel. to the  
Head of HH) 
Age Mean of  fetching water 
Amount of  
water fetched 
Frequency of  
fetching water 
Simon 10 (Head) Wife 
Son 
58 
48 
22 
Car/ Donkey-
cart 
By foot 
Donkey-cart 
200 to 300 liter 
25 liter 
200 to 300 liter 
Sporadically 
2 x day 
Sporadically 
Uakotora 14 
Wife 
Sister 
Children 
45 
45 
5-20 
By foot 
By foot 
By foot 
25 liter 
25 liter 
as much as they can 
2 x day 
2 x day 
1 x day 
Petrus 23 
Wife 
Daughter 
Children 
64 
39 
5-20 
By foot 
By foot 
By foot 
25 liter 
25 liter 
as much as they can  
2 x day 
2 x day 
1 x day 
Andreas 9 Uncle 39 Donkey-cart 200 to 300 liter 1 x week 
Mutoto 2 Wife 27 By foot 25 liter 2 x day 
Josef 9 Children 5-17 By feet as much as they can  2 or 3 x day 
58 
 
(above all in numbers of cattle), the more interest this person has regarding the access to 
water.  
All registered households in the community bring their animals one-time daily to drink 
water, either to the water point in the respective community or to a natural water fountain. 
A systematic assessment of the number of adult cows, heifers, adult goats, kids, etc. and 
their respective weights was not carried out. Nevertheless, considering that half of the 
cattle of Uakotora (the richest villager in Okarongo) is of adult age and considering that 
only these cattle (13 exemplars) consume between 1170 and 1755 liters of water daily, one 
can assume that the amounts of water needed to care for these animals is considerable.  
In Okarongo, besides the households’ livestock, eight dromedaries from the NGO 
also use the water point in the village. Comparatively, under certain conditions the 
dromedaries can use less water than goats and sheep (cf. Gihad et. al. 1989), but they can 
also drink 8 liters of water daily or more depending on the temperature (cf. Gutiérrez et. al. 
2002: 440). Due to their number, their water consumption can be similar or less than the 
poor households in the community. 
6.2.3 Gardening 
Since the cultivation of gardens in the village is very limited, no substantial quantities of 
water is used for this activity. Simon (the only person who owns and cultivates a garden) 
fetches water with his car for his garden using eight 25-liter containers. Nevertheless, the 
frequency of transporting water from the water point to the garden with the vehicle is quite 
irregular as gasoline is needed. For this reason, he only uses a small part of it for 
cultivating tobacco; an activity not carried out during the whole year.  
6.2.4 Other (the campsite)  
The quantity of water used for the campsite situated in Okarongo could not be precisely 
assessed. The campsite has a container with the capacity to store 1000 liters of water in 
order to provide water for the shower and the toilet. Nevertheless, the container is never 
filled up totally due to money shortages for the machine pump used for that purpose and 
because it has not been working efficiently due to a mechanical defect. If there is no 
gasoline for the pump, several 25 liter containers transport the water to the campsite’s 1000 
liter container. Moreover, water is only pumped or transported when tourists visit the 
campsite and not enough water is available in the mentioned container. Since tourists only 
visited the campsite on an irregular basis and in varying numbers, a rough estimation is 
therefore even more difficult to make. Important is that the hand pump used at the water 
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point has to be closed if the water machine pump is used, because otherwise the machine 
pump does not pump water properly (which is, in turn, a source of conflict in Okarongo). 
Therefore, the machine pump is connected to a pipe coming from the underground at the 
water point.  
6.3 Water management regulations 
As already mentioned, the two hand pumps in the village were donated and installed by a 
humanitarian organisation in mid-2005 and at the end of 2006 respectively. The 
installation of the hand pumps followed after certain villagers of the community 
approached the organisation for support. These community members were Petrus, who was 
the first person to approach the organisation, and Simon, who organized that the second 
hand pump got installed. The decision of approaching the organisation, however, was 
taken by these persons separately.  
It was not until the second hand pump was installed at Simon’s water point, 
however, that the members of the organisation are said to have told the villagers that both 
of the water points had to be managed by a common water committee, according to Petrus. 
The Headman stated that, after finishing the installation of the second hand pump, the 
humanitarian organisation had carried out a workshop for the villagers in which some 
advice was given for how to form a water committee (W.C.) as well as how to manage the 
hand pump. He added that the water committee was democratically elected, and that the 
representatives of the humanitarian organisation designated him as the Chairman. This was 
reinforced by two other committee members (the daughter of Andreas and a son of Petrus). 
After the installation of both hand pumps, however, the persons that had approached the 
humanitarian organisation (Petrus and Simon) were instructed how to repair and maintain 
them. 
The information collected in relation to the establishment of the water committee 
showed one inconsistency. While the declarations of four participants interviewed for this 
purpose coincided with the persons and their respective functions in the water committee, 
the Headman’s declaration differed from them in one person: the treasurer of the water 
committee (see Table 9 below).47  
 
 
                                                 
 
47
 The persons depicted in Table 9 were chosen for to collect information regarding the composition of the 
water committee as they were themselves part of the same.  
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Alleged  
member 
Function 
within  
the W.C. 
Informants and their corresponded 
declarations 
Simon 
(Headm
an) 
Organizer & 
Treasurer 1* 
(Adult daughter 
of Andreas and 
Joan, the wife 
of Afrika) 
Secretary 2 
(Adult son of 
Petrus) 
Simon   Chairman ● ● ● 
Afrika’s wife, Joan Treasurer 1   ● ● 
Uakotora Treasurer 2   ● ● 
Simon’s wife, Ngunoe Treasurer (?) ●     
One of Simon’s adult daughters Secretary 1 ● ● ● 
One of Petrus’ adult sons Secretary 2 ● ● ● 
Another son of Petrus  Organizer 1 ● ● ● 
One of Andreas’ adult daughters Organizer 2 ● ● ● 
*Interview has been carried out with both of them at the same time. 
 
According to the Organizer, the persons for the positions “Treasurer1” and “Treasurer2” in 
the table were democratically elected by the community within the framework of the 
humanitarian organization’s intervention, while some time later, Simon’s wife, Ngunoe, 
was appointed personally by him for that position. The reason for this later appointment 
could not be cleared, but it is possible that in doing so, Simon aimed to gain more control 
over any money contributions either if for the maintenance of his water point or for other 
purposes. It is also important to mention that after its establishment, the water committee 
did not hold even one meeting and that its members did not exercise their functions 
including Simon’s wife48. The reasons for this, as described more elaborately in section 7, 
seem to be rooted in the individual interests that led to the approach of the humanitarian 
organization and in the development of the water conflict.  
According to one of the Secretaries (one of Petrus’ adult sons), the following tasks 
are supposed to be linked to the functions displayed in the table above:  
 Organizers: to keep the surroundings of the water points clean as well as the drinking 
canal for the animals. Moreover, they are responsible for pumping water into the canal 
if it is empty. 
 Secretaries: to register the problems concerning the water management and the 
functioning of the water pumps.  
                                                 
 
48
 According to him, his wife did not try to collect money anymore because no one wanted to cooperate.  
Table 9. Members of the water committee and their functions according to the Headman, and three 
other water committee members in Okarongo 
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 Treasurers: to collect and administer money for the maintenance of the water points and 
their hand pumps. 
 Chairperson: to collect the problems registered by the Secretaries, organize meetings and 
if necessary contact the humanitarian organization.   
 
The first conversation about the specific rules concerning the water management in the 
village was carried out with Simon the Headman. According to him, the members of the 
humanitarian organisation gave him personally a list of rules exclusively for his water 
point and that he announced them to the community. However, in a later interview 
conducted with one of his daughters and at the same time secretary of the water point, she 
claimed her father wrote the regulations himself. Simon, who was present at the time of the 
interview (the conversation could only be carried out in his presence, because he ordered 
his daughter not to give any interview in his absence), confirmed that he had composed the 
rules himself and then had presented them to the humanitarian organisation before 
introducing them to the community.  
On the other hand, the second secretary of the water point (one adult son of Petrus – 
the later having constructed the “W.P.1”) affirmed instead that the rules were developed by 
the community itself, but with the assistance of the humanitarian organisation and that 
some of the rules, which were conceived originally for “W.P.2”, should be taken as 
guidelines also for using the “W.P.1”. Other Committee members – one organizer and one 
treasurer (one of Andreas’ adult daughters and the wife of Afrika, respectively) – stated in 
an interview conducted with both of them, in turn, that the humanitarian organisation 
composed the rules, nevertheless only for “W.P.2”. The organisation, they explained, gave 
the regulations to them within the framework of a community meeting, the same day they 
handed over the second hand pump to the village at the end of 2006.  
Why Simon assured first that the humanitarian organisation had given him the rules 
and later that he had actually created them, could have been a strategy to reinforce his ruler 
status since his legitimation as Headman had been questioned by several villagers, as 
already mentioned. Taking into account that the intervention of the humanitarian 
organisation took place over a year ago, the subtle dissimilarities in the responses of the 
secretary, the organizer and the treasurer may be the result of varying recollections. 
However, the contradictions in the Headman’s statements versus the information of the 
other participants leave the impression that it is less plausible that he was the real or the 
sole composer of the water point rules. More probably is that the community developed the 
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rules with the assistance of the humanitarian organisation or that the rules were handed 
over to them by the organisation.  
A written list of the regulations concerning water management in the village (and the 
members and functions of the water committee as well) did presumably exist, but was not 
available during the research activities. Simon assured that he was in possession of these 
documents somewhere in his household. Nevertheless, when asked on numerous occasions 
to see the documents, he responded that he had not found them yet. In light of this, the 
rules were recorded by interviewing the villagers, especially members of the water 
committee, as it was assumed that they would know the rules better than non-members: the 
chairman (Simon the Headman), one of the organizers (a daughter of the Andreas) one of 
the treasurers (the wife of Afrika) and one of the secretaries (one of Petrus’ adult sons). 
Table 10 shows the outcomes of the respective interviews. 
Informants and their corresponded declarations 
Rule Chairman (Headman) 
Organizer & 
Treasurer 1* 
(Adult daughter of 
Head of HH#6 & 
Wife of Head of 
HH#1) 
Secretary 2 
(Adult son of 
Head of HH#5) 
From 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. people should fetch water 
or private use only. Animals should be brought to 
drink water onlyin the afternoon.   
● 
  
Do not wash clothes or take a shower in the canal 
of the WP (only down river from where the WP is 
located). 
● ● ● 
The WP and its surrounding area must be kept 
clean.  ● ● ● 
Every morning there must be an adequate amount 
of clean water in the canal. ●     
Owners must fill the canal with water for their 
animals. ● ●   
The canal has to be full every time the owners 
leave the WP.   ●   
People should not fetch water while animals are 
drinking.   ●   
Trees around the w.p. do not have to be cut.  ●     
*Interview has been carried out with both of them at the same time. 
 
As it can be observed in the table, there were some dissimilarities between the declarations 
of the interviewees. At this, it is important to consider, that the recording of the rules 
implied a methodological difficulty: the participants were asked to mention rules that 
seemed to have been created during the intervention of the humanitarian organisation 
Table 10. Rules for the water management in Okarongo 
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(almost two years before the research activities) and since then never renegotiated or 
discussed within the framework of the water committee or community meeting, and – 
according to observations and interviews in the field – not even being followed or 
implemented (with some exceptions in the rules concerning the hygiene at the water point, 
where the participants coincided the most).  
A way to reduce these dissimilarities (besides the implementation of group 
interviews, which were generally excluded from the project in order to prevent any kind of 
confrontations within the villagers) could have been to show each participant the list of 
rules collected from a previous interviewee. This meant for example, to have shown the 
organizer and the treasurer the rules recorded in the interview with the Headman (without 
telling them that the Headman was the author of them) so that they could have been 
compared with the rules they have previously mentioned. In doing so, it would have been 
possible that they would have declared if any rule was superfluous or wrong or if any rule 
was missing according to their judgement. The same procedure could have been repeated 
several times (at best interviewing also non-members of the water committee that were 
present when the rules have been developed) until a consensus about the water 
management regulations would have been reached. Nevertheless, two important reasons 
argued against this procedure: first, the unpredictable amounts of time that would have 
been necessary for this undertaking. And second, that the rules depicted in the table were 
not the source of conflict in Okarongo anyway. Hence, in the light of the time limitations 
of the project and the quite intricate water conflict found in the community, it has been 
decided to save time for inquiring it more in detail and understand its different aspects.   
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7 The water conflict in Okarongo 
A few days after our arrival in Okarongo, we ascertained that the water problems in the 
community were more complex and serious than earlier recorded during our first visit. The 
most frequent issue registered through the census questionnaire, the Semi-structured 
Interviews and the Conflict Mapping, was that the Headman had put a lock on the hand 
pump several times before our arrival. However, the participants declared that the hand 
pump only had remained locked for a minimum of two and maximum of four days, before 
the Headman opens it again. Numerous aspects played various yet altogether important 
roles in the water conflict in general. During the fieldwork activities and the analysis of the 
gathered data, it could be determined that some of these aspects were having a multi-
layered influence in the dynamics of the conflict and that some of them were related to one 
another. In this section, these aspects are depicted along with the chain of events and the 
actors that have shaped the water conflict in Okarongo.  
7.1 Some antecedents  
Considering the history of Okarongo, the first serious incident related with water issues 
seemed to be a fight between Petrus and Simon in the year 2002. Before this incident, 
Petrus had decided to dig a water hole in the village, because the natural fountains that his 
household was using to fetch water for cooking, washing etc. were too far away.49 Petrus 
never wanted to move closer to the water fountains, because this would have meant 
moving further away from the main road, which is the only way to catch a lift to the shops, 
to the hospital etc. 
At that time, however, a water hole owned by Simon already existed in the village. 
This, in turn, was the reason why Petrus did not want to ask the Headman for permission to 
use it: he did not want to be dependent on him.50 Therefore, he decided to begin digging an 
additional water hole closer to his household. There were two problems with his choice of 
action. First, he did not consult with Simon and second, the water hole he was digging was 
located upstream on the same river where the Simons water point is situated.  
When Petrus began with the digging, Simon was absent selling some of his animals 
in Sesfontein (an activity that can take several weeks). Petrus approached a humanitarian 
                                                 
 
49
 Bringing the animals to the water fountains, in contrast, did not constitute a big problem since his 
household was used to taking the cattle and the goats out of the village to graze anyway. Apart from Petrus 
household, other two were using the natural fountains for their animals and for human consumption. These 
were Uakotora’s household and  another household that moved sometime in 2006.  
50
 Simon was already sharing the water hole with Afrika: the household of his wife’s sister.  
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organisation for technical support since he wanted to install a hand pump over the water 
hole. Sometime later, the humanitarian workers came to Okarongo. However, Simon 
prevented a meeting between the two parties. According to Petrus, the members of the 
organisation came a few days after the Headman had come back to the village from selling 
some of his animals. When they arrived, they met Simon and asked him for Petrus. It was 
then that Simon came to know about his co-villager’s intentions of constructing a water 
point. Therefore, so Petrus continued, the Headman told the humanitarian workers that the 
person they were looking for was not living in the village. Thereupon, the Headman is said 
to have come to his household and to have reproached him furiously. For, he did not have 
any permission to call the humanitarian organisation and to construct a water hole in his 
premises. Simon then forbade him to finish the water hole he was digging with the 
argument that his water hole would dry up as a consequence. In the discussion, Petrus lost 
his temper because of Simon’s prohibition, but above all because he had misled the 
humanitarian workers and told them to leave. Finally, the heated discussion ended with a 
fight, which Petrus began by punching the Headman in the face. 
A few days after the incident, so Uakotora, a meeting with Herero Headmen called 
by Simon himself, took place in the village from which he originates (42 km away from 
Okarongo). There, the traditional authorities are said to have given the advice to the 
participants in the meeting to cooperate with one another and to work together in order to 
supply the community with water. All Heads of households that made up the village at that 
time were present: Afrika, Simon, Petrus, Uakotora and the Head of the household that left 
the village in 2006. Nevertheless, the tensions appeared to have remained, because the 
households that were using the natural fountains (Uakotora’s, Petrus’ and the household 
which moved from Okarongo) did eventually construct a water point in 2005 independent 
of the Headman’s wishes. This water point is identified as “W.P.1” in Figure 7 above. In 
contrast to the further rather individualistic enterprise of Petrus, this time the construction 
of the water point was a joint venture between him, Uakotora and the Head of the 
household which moved from Okarongo, whereby Uakotora was the one, who motivated 
the other two men to dig the water hole. In this undertaking, the humanitarian organisation 
came into play again. Petrus managed to bring some humanitarian workers to the village 
(from the same organisation he approached in the past) in order to install a hand pump over 
the water hole the three men had previously dug. This time, Simon could not have any 
problem with the construction of the water point since it was located in another river far 
away from his, which implied, in turn, that the water of his water hole would not be 
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affected. The problems, however, came approximately two years later, when the water 
point in mention (“W.P.1”) was damaged. This situation will be depicted in the next 
section.  
7.2 The constrained usability of the water point (“W.P.1”) and its consequences 
The “W.P.1” worked well until the beginning of 2007, shortly after Simon managed to 
install (also with the help of the humanitarian organisation) a hand pump over his water 
point as well (“W.P.2” in Figure 7 above). The Headman declared that he had approached 
the humanitarian organisation, because he needed a hand pump for himself as his water 
machine pump was seriously damaged during the rainy season ending 2005. According to 
his statement, the government gave him the machine pump in support of his initiative to 
construct the campsite. When the machine pump was damaged, he was not able to repair it 
due to money shortages. Support from the government in this matter was not to be 
expected, as the officials told him when he got the machine pump that he would be 
responsible for the repair by his own means in case of damage. 
Regarding the damage of the water point “W.P.1”, according to Uakotora, it was 
not the hand pump itself, but rather something in the underground preventing water from 
being pumped up. As already told, water could still be fetched by pulling it up through a 
hole in the cement basis using a bucket tied to a rope, but some villagers avoided 
consuming the water because it was polluted (due to the open hole). Before the water point 
“W.P.1” became unusable, Uakotora’s together with Petrus’ and Jonas’ households (the 
later settled in the village in 2005) were using it actively for human consumption. The 
animals, in turn, were still being brought to the natural water fountains so that they could 
graze in the surroundings as well. The animals were only brought to the water point in 
mention if water scarcity at the water fountains was prevailing.  
According to a declaration of Uakotora, however, the constrained usability of the 
water point “W.P.1” together with the mainly seasonal-conditioned water scarcity at the 
natural water fountains forced the villagers to bring their animals to the Headman’s water 
point. When the water point “W.P.1” was damaged, its users asked Simon for permission 
in order to fetch water at his water point. According to Petrus, Simon was not very 
enthusiastic about this and he only tolerated it reluctantly.  
Nevertheless, in some cases Simon seemed not to tolerate it at all. The members of 
Mutoto’s household were told by the Headman not to come to the water point “W.P.2” the 
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first day they settled in the village (sometime in April 2008).51 Moreover, the Jonas 
declared that the Headman used to throw stones at the animals if they came too close to his 
water point. The sons of Uakotora said, in turn, that they were chased away by the 
Headman several times when they brought their goats to his water point and that he 
threatened to lock the hand pump if they should bring the animals again. If Simon was in 
fact fulfilling his threat of locking the hand pump, was, however, difficult to prove. On the 
one hand, Uakotora confirmed that Simon was indeed locking the hand pump, but he could 
only speculate that the reason was that he and the other households used his water during 
the dry season for their animals as Simon never told them why he locked it. He assured, 
though, that the frictions and discussions with the Headman regarding water in general 
increased above all during these periods of time, when, according to several participants, 
less water could be pumped up at his water point. 
On the other hand, during an interview with the Headman, he told me that the hand 
pump was in fact being locked, but only sometimes during the rainy season and with the 
previous consultation of the community. He said that the decision of locking the hand 
pump with a padlock was always discussed within the framework of a community meeting 
in order to preserve the water in the village. Nevertheless, there is an important 
inconsistency: no participant could reinforce that these reunions actually took place. 
Additionally, other villagers and the Headman himself mentioned that the water committee 
in the village had not met since the day of its creation, beginning in 2007. Accordingly, if 
the hand pump was indeed being locked during the rainy season, all indications pointed to 
the community not having been consulted. If the hand pump was in fact being locked 
during the dry season (as Uakotora declared), in turn, it would thus be a more serious act. 
For, Simon would be denying his co-villagers the access to water arbitrarily in times of 
need. 
7.3 The overgrazing problems in the village and the water conflict 
According to all Heads of household, there are acute overgrazing problems around the 
water point and the immediate surroundings of the village. For this reason, for several 
households it is not necessarily a disadvantage to take the animals to the natural water 
fountains although there is a functioning water point in the village, because they have to 
take them out of the community area anyway in order to graze. Altogether, this routine is 
                                                 
 
51
 Nevertheless, they were using – like the other households – the water hole when water scarcity at the 
natural water fountains was prevailing. 
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practiced by Uakotora’s, Petrus’, Jonas’ and Mutoto’s households respectively, whereby 
they support each other in this task, as already mentioned.52 Afrika’s, Andreas’ and 
Simon’s households are situated – in comparison to the other households – very far away 
from the natural fountains (compare Figure 7 above). They use other areas in the 
surroundings of the community for grazing, but bring their animals to the water point in the 
village.  
Regarding the grazing practices of the households no conflict between them could 
be registered except between the Headman and Andreas. According to the later, his wife 
Elizabeth wanted to take the animals to the area where Simon’s herd used to graze, because 
she had sighted a lion in the direction in which her household used to take the animals to 
pasture.53 She is said to have asked Simon if she could bring the animals to the area in 
mention, but he answered that if she did bring them there, he would lock the hand pump. 
Despite the Headman’s warning, Andreas continued, she took the animals in the direction 
of Simon’s herd and the next day the hand pump was indeed locked. According to this, it 
seems that Simon wanted to avoid the risk of overgrazing by sharing his pasturing area 
with another household. 
Similar incidents like the previous one were not assessed, but the overgrazing 
problems in general seem to be a reason for Simon locking the hand pump. Once, he 
admitted openly that it was his own decision to lock it (without consulting the community), 
because he wanted to solve the overgrazing problems. The reason behind this was to force 
the villagers to take their livestock to other areas so that the grazes around the water point 
and in the immediate surroundings of the village can recover. He justified his action as an 
absolute necessary evil for the community in general. He said according to the translation 
of my interpreter: “if I don’t lock the hand pump, there will be no grazes and the animals 
will die”. Here, assuming that Simon really locks the hand pump for this reason,54 it is 
comprehensible that he, as livestock owner, could have the interest (like surely the other 
households in Okarongo as well) of not having to graze far away from the village since this 
implies covering long walking distances and maybe also the danger of encountering wild 
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 Josef’s household lives like the other households on the side closer to the water fountains. However, the 
woman who is usually in charge of the animals (because her spouse spends a lot of time in the bush due to 
his work as tracker for the NGO), takes the animals to the Headman’s water point too. As they were new in 
the village, they were not joining the other households in going to the natural water fountains.  
53
 The interviewee (Andreas) was in the bush tracking animals for the NGO at the time when the incident 
occurred. That’s why he was not involved directly in the happenings.  
54
 It could not be expected that Simon only tells the truth considering the inconsistencies in relation with his 
first reason for locking the hand pump (see previous section).  
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animals (like lions or cheetahs) that could attack the cattle or goats etc. Nevertheless, in 
this matter it is arguable to what extent his individual decision of denying the access to the 
other villagers arbitrarily and without consent, would alone contribute to solving the 
overgrazing problem.  
7.4 The Headman’s claims of ownership over the W.P. and its contradictions  
There are some contradictions within Simon’s claims of ownership over the water point. 
First, his discourse of ownership over the water hole has been challenged and second, the 
hand pump installed over it was donated with the intention of being managed by the 
community as a whole.  
During the interviews, the Headman assured that he was the owner of the water 
point, because he was the only one, who dug it.55 Nevertheless, Jonas affirmed having 
helped Simon personally with the enterprise. To this, he added that there were two persons 
(both relatives of the Headman) – now living in another village – that could confirm that he 
helped him with the construction of the water hole. Although Andreas could not confirm 
that Jonas had indeed helped the Headman, he instead affirmed that a person now living in 
Sesfontein was the one who began to dig the water hole, but gave up because he did not 
have the proper tools for the job. The rest of the Head of households interviewed could not 
confirm the declarations of Jonas and Andreas respectively. They only knew that Simon 
was the only one who had dug the hole. Only one grandson from Afrika confirmed that the 
Headman was not the only one who dug the waterhole. His father, who passed away some 
years ago, helped Simon with its construction. 
During an interview with Simon concerning the ownership of the water point, he 
showed me several pictures in which he appeared alone digging the hole in order to prove 
that no one helped him and that therefore, the water point belonged to him. A couple of 
weeks later, I was “hanging out” (see Russell 2006: 368f) at the water point. There were 
several young people playing cards and talking with one another. Suddenly, a young man 
with whom I played soccer in the village called me and showed me a picture. He took it 
from a notebook from Simon’s adolescent daughter while the young girl was talking with 
other girls. The image was similar to the pictures the Headman showed me the day of the 
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 Simon even declared that there are documents in a certain governmental office in Sesfontein that could 
prove his legal ownership over the terrain, where the water point is located. Nevertheless, through an 
interview with the official in charge of the bureau in mention, this claim could not be verified because the 
respective documents do not exist. In order to protect the anonymity of the „Headman”, I did not refer to him 
in front of the governmental authority neither with his name nor with his title. I asked the official if he knew 
of any ownership documents concerning the water point in Okarongo. 
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interview with a man visible digging a hole. I asked the young man who was the man in 
the photograph and he told me that he was the deceased father of the grandson of Afrika. 
Subsequently, I asked the young man if his father did in fact help the Headman with the 
digging of the water hole and he answered affirmatively. His father had died a few months 
after the water hole was finished. Jonas, who affirmed having helped the Headman with the 
water hole, knew also of this man, but he did not mention him before, because talking 
about deceased persons is commonly avoided in the regional culture. 
Furthermore, after the humanitarian organisation installed the hand pump over 
Simon’s water hole, its workers were said to have announced that not only the Headman’s 
hand pump, but also the hand pump that had already been installed in the village, should be 
managed by the water committee, according to Petrus. This, however, seemed not to be 
expected by Simon from the beginning. As noted above, he approached the humanitarian 
organisation, because he needed a hand pump for himself and not for the whole 
community. According to the prescriptions of the humanitarian organisation, other 
framework conditions concerning the water management had been established in 
Okarongo. Here, the community as a whole was asked to cooperate and to manage the 
water usage/access, a situation that seemed not to be expected by the Headman. However, 
this was not the solution for the existing water conflict. For, it was made up of other forms 
and facets. The rules once developed for the water points were being neither negotiated nor 
discussed or implemented and as already mentioned, the water committee (and the 
community) has not held even one meeting concerning water issues since its constitution. 
Moreover, the hand pump has been locked on an arbitrary basis and there are new 
important challenges to be confronted such as the maintenance of the water points’ hand 
pumps. 56 
7.5 The money contributions problem 
According to three participants, the villagers’ unwillingness to give Simon money for the 
hand pump’s maintenance is also a reason for him to lock the hand pump. The information 
gathered by the Ethnographic Census shows in fact that no household pays any kind of 
money contribution in relation with water issues. The Headman for his part – although he 
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 As this subsection has shown, the ownership of the water point is an unclear issue. Despite of this, I will 
still keep of referring to “W.P.2” as if it were Simon’s water point, so the reader can easily identify to which 
water point I am alluding.  
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did not say, that he indeed locked the hand pump for this reason – affirmed indignantly that 
no one helped him with money for the hand pump’s maintenance.  
In relation to this, however, several reasons for the unwillingness to cooperate with 
Simon could be determined through the interviews. Petrus, for example, made clear his 
reason for mistrusting the Headman was on the basis of an actual incident with him. He 
declared that Simon sold a bag full of shoes that had been donated to the community by the 
South African students, who had voluntarily come to help in the campsite. The Headman 
was said to have given some of the shoes only to his family and then to have sold the rest 
in another village. Therefore, Petrus justifies his unwillingness to give Simon money for 
the hand pump, because he felt he is also not cooperating with the community. To this, he 
added that every time Simon asked for money, he only wanted it for his water point 
although the second one was completely unusable for more than a year. Within this 
context, to one of the Secretaries of the water committee (and at the same time, son of 
Petrus) it seemed suspicious to give the Headman money, because there are democratically 
elected treasurers (the wife of Afrika and Uakotora) in charge of that task. Afrika also sees 
a problem in that the Headman appointed his wife as the treasurer, because this allowed the 
people to think that he was able to take the money for private use. Uakotora said once, in 
turn, that as Simon had already closed the hand pump for four days, he did not want to 
cooperate with him in any way. Furthermore, Jonas believed that the Headman is even 
deceiving the community when he asks for money. He said that Simon removed parts of 
the hand pump furtively and temporarily and then went to the households in order to ask 
for money although it is in fact not necessary.  
However, the main reason for Jonas to not cooperate with contributing money was 
because of an arrangement made between the NGO settled in the village and the Headman. 
The Head of household stated that as the NGO was paying 350N$ monthly to Simon for 
the water usage, he didn’t see any necessity in giving him additional money. He explained 
that the 350N$ are for the dromedaries and for the complete NGO’s staff (from which 
Jonas is a member) settled in the in the community.57 The same reason was also given by 
Andreas and the grandson from Afrika, both workers of the NGO.58  
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 The dromedaries are used to track and monitor the wild animals the NGO is said to protect.  
58
 It is important to mention that Andreas believes that Simon does not want to repair or let other villagers 
construct another water point, because otherwise he would lose the monopoly over the described agreement 
with the NGO.   
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Simon himself confirmed this arrangement, but he added that there were some 
problems. According to him, the NGO was not paying 350N$, but rather 300N$ and this 
was only for the dromedaries and the staff, not for the families and their cattle, goats, sheep 
etc. that have settled in the village because of the NGO. To this, he added that he paid 
almost 1200N$ for repairing the hand pump, because he had to pay for the gasoline in 
order to reach the next big towns (almost five or six hours drive) by car where the 
reparation could be carried out. Nevertheless, there are some important inconsistencies 
with his declaration. Altogether, four participants stated that the hand pump was only once 
seriously damaged and that on that occasion the NGO arranged its reparation. They 
coincided in saying that workers from the NGO (but not the staff living in the community) 
dismantled the hand pump and transported it with a car to the next town for its repair. 
Furthermore, it was said that all implied costs were absorbed by the NGO. Andreas added 
that the NGO had given the Headman money every time problems with the hand pump 
arose and that if the hand pump was unusable for a while, he was given gasoline to operate 
the machine pump (he normally used for pumping water into the camp-site) in the 
meantime. 
7.6 The role of the tourist’s camp-site in the water conflict 
According to Presilla, the wife of Petrus, the Headman locked the hand pump because of 
damages caused by the villager’s cattle in his campsite. Simon, in turn, never said that he 
had locked the hand pump for this reason, but during some interviews, he expressed that he 
is indeed very upset about the damages. According to him, unsupervised cattle had come 
into his campsite a repeated number of times destroying the fence around it and some 
objects in it such as the shower, the toilet and a small roof offering shadow. He added that 
if he were the government, he would have already displaced all households from the 
village, because as of yet he had invested 3000N$ only for repairing the damages their 
animals had caused.  
Presilla explained that the cattle went into the campsite breaking the fence and 
damaging the objects, because they were looking for something fresh situated in the 
garden. This was said to happen often during the nights when the cattle came alone from 
the bush every time when they had not been collected previously during the afternoon. 
Nevertheless, she added that it was Simon’s fault that the animals had come into the 
campsite, because it was his responsibility to build a strong fence around it in order to 
prevent them from causing any damages. In relation to this, according Uakotora, cattle 
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from Jonas’, Andreas’, Petrus’ and also including his had come into the campsite. Simon, 
in turn, declared that all households allowed their animals to come onto his property, partly 
because they had not given them water and so they went into the campsite looking for 
water. Within this context, it is important to mention that only Uakotora had given the 
Headman a goat in compensation for the damages caused to the campsite by his animals; 
other households, according to Uakotora himself, have as yet not provided Simon with 
compensation.  
However, additional information in relation with the campsite could provide insight into 
the reasons why the villagers had left Simon alone with the reparation of his property. First 
of all, at the time of the campsite’s construction, it was agreed upon within the framework 
of a meeting with Simon that he would give a part of his profit to the community, because 
the campsite was in an open area according to Petrus. Joan, the wife of Afrika declared, in 
turn, that the Headman himself had promised to help the children in the village with 
transport to school if his campsite produced extra earnings. Nevertheless, according to the 
two interviewees, Simon has not kept the promise. Simon said, however, that the campsite 
had never run well and that the garden did not produce enough vegetables and fruits. In 
addition, Jonas declared that the NGO in the village was even supporting Simon with the 
campsite. He explained that the tourists, who had come to take wildlife tours within the 
framework of the services of the organisation, stayed in the campsite for a couple of days. 
He complained that they were just doing him a favour and that he was not given anything 
in return.  
Second, according to Aline, the wife of Uakotora, she declared that she had 
resigned to the fact that the Headman had decided to arbitrarily lock the hand pump in 
order to pump water into the campsite. At this, the Headman was said to have told the 
villagers that when he was pumping water into the campsite they could not use the water 
point in the meantime. To this matter, Simon declared during an interview that he used a 
machine pump for this purpose, but he did not mention explicitly that in doing so, he 
locked the hand pump. He just stated that the hand pump had not to be operated, because 
otherwise the machine pump would not pump water properly.59 Hence, if the villagers do 
not receive any benefits from the campsite, whereas in order to run it their access to water 
is being denied, it may be difficult for them to develop a sense of belonging towards the 
camping place and thus to take care of it.  
                                                 
 
59
 The machine pump Simon was using was borrowed from another Headman. 
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7.7 The role of the NGO 
Apart from the previously mentioned agreement between the NGO and Simon in relation 
with the water usage, there is another important aspect of the NGO’s role in the water 
conflict.  
According to Jonas and Emma, his wife, the Headman closed the hand pump out of 
fear that the people working for the NGO and their livestock could finish the water, which 
he in turn needed for his campsite. To this, Jonas added that Simon locked the hand pump 
usually when he and his work-colleagues were in the bush tracking animals on behalf of 
the NGO. Once, however, he was in the village when it happened and decided to break the 
lock. Afterwards, he continued, the action almost culminated into a fight with Simon as the 
latter figured out that he was the one who opened the hand pump’s lock.  
Although the Headman did not admit to close the hand pump for the above-
mentioned reason, he did several times express that he is upset with the newcomers of the 
NGO. He declared, for example, that he was having too many quarrels with those 
households (altogether three: Jonas’, Andreas’ and Mutoto’s households) and that he felt 
that there was a competition over his goods. He had tried to speak to a representative of the 
NGO in order to discuss the situation, because it was not in the arrangement that the NGO 
workers would come with their families and animals and settle permanently in the area. 
That these families were not very welcome could be perceived through a declaration of 
Andreas. He said that Simon approached him (as the most important person on site 
representing the NGO) several times telling him that the households that came because of 
the NGO had to leave the village. 
7.8 Private issues 
Locking the hand pump, because certain Heads of households do not compensate him for 
the caused damages to his campsite or, because he does not like Elizabeth, the wife of 
Andreas, to come with her animals to his grazing area, are some examples of the Headman 
instrumentalizing the hand pump to solve private matters. However, these do not seem to 
be the only cases in which this has happened.  
For example, the Headman is said to have locked the hand pump repeatedly, 
because of private issues between him, his wife and Andreas with his wife Elizabeth (so an 
adult daughter of Andreas). Nevertheless, none of the participants asked about this matter 
(Andreas, Elizabeth, and his daughter) wanted to explain the backgrounds, but they all 
assured me that the problems do not have to do with water issues.  
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However, another incident showed that the Headman was not only 
instrumentalizing the hand pump, but possibly also trying to violently demonstrate that he 
must be obeyed. Altogether three Heads of household mentioned that the Headman had 
beaten a young man once, because the later had brought his goats to the water point after 
the Headman had warned him not to do it. The 23-year-old man involved in the incident 
that occurred in 2005, related for his part what happened. According to him, before the 
incident, the Headman had called for a meeting in order to communicate to the community 
some information from the conservancy of Sesfontein. However, the young man told the 
Headman that he would not participate in the reunion, because it was “too boring”. In view 
of this, the Headman told him that if he would not go to the meeting, he should then not 
bring the goats to the water point. The young man in fact did not attend the reunion and the 
next day he brought the goats to the prohibited place. Consequently, the Headman beat him 
in the head.  
7.9 Witchcraft 
Within the framework of the water conflict in Okarongo, witchcraft also has played an 
important role. As reported in southern Africa, the overwhelming explanation for 
witchcraft is jealousy (cf. Thomas 2007). Such is also the case in Okarongo. The Headman 
and his wife assured me that one of their adult sons (22) had been bewitched, because 
someone was jealous that they owned the water point and the campsite. The son himself 
described to me that he felt as though two opposing magnets were inside of him and that he 
was therefore not sleeping very well. His parents added, in turn, that he was shouting and 
running through the night without a cause and speaking nonsense. At this, they said they 
believed to know which person in the village was producing the witchcraft affecting their 
son, but did not want to mention her/his name because they are not exactly sure of their 
suspicion. In other parts of Africa, persons pointed out to be witches run the risk of being 
victims of social isolation or even violence (cf. Ashforth 1998). According to my 
interpreter, identified witches in the region can share this destiny as well. Nevertheless, if 
the accusing persons point to the wrong person, they are the ones who can be socially 
isolated and they also run the risk of increasing the effects of the witchcraft. For this 
reason, Simon and his wife were very careful in mentioning names.  
An attempt to explore this topic more deeply was very difficult. None of the other 
villagers asked in this matter, admitted having any kind of knowledge about witchcraft or 
sorcery in the village and did not want to talk about this subject in general. Nevertheless, 
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my interpreter advised me that they surely know something, but that they refused to tell me 
anything, because witchcraft as such is a very delicate issue.  
However, analysing this aspect within the framework of the water conflict, it is 
legitimate to ask what advantage Simon could have in speaking of his son being 
bewitched. At first sight, if he had in fact pointed to a certain person being the culprit of his 
son’s illness, it is arguable to what extend would other villagers agree with his accusation 
considering his role in the conflict and that he is not acknowledged as the official 
Headman. Nevertheless, if he approaches a “witch-doctor”, the later has the legitimation to 
name the person responsible, to make hints as to the perpetrator’s identity, or to verify the 
already held suspicions of the family. Here the question would be whether the “witch-
doctor” has a high enough reputation so that his declarations can be followed up by the rest 
of the community. If he does, maybe Simon achieves an advantage in the conflict indeed.60   
7.10 The external actors 
An important governmental official settled in Sesfontein has been approached three times 
by members of the community in order to denounce Simon’s arbitrary actions. The 
humanitarian organisation (which donated the hand pumps) was approached for this same 
reason as well, but only one time.61 According to Andreas, however, the official could only 
warn the Headman two of the three times this warning occurred in another village between 
Sesfontein and the residence of the villagers (a reason why not all the Heads of household 
could be present). The reason for this was because Okarongo is quite far away from 
Sesfontein (approximately 62 km) and the official did not have enough petrol to reach the 
community, according to Andreas. At the two meetings, the official is said to have warned 
Simon that locking the hand pump was an illegal action.62 Additionally, the members of 
the humanitarian organisation were said to have come to the village and to have reminded 
the Headman that the hand pump was donated to the whole community and therefore 
should not be only for his personal use. At this, so Andreas added, Simon was told that if 
he locked the hand pump again, the hand pump would have to be removed. In spite of 
these interventions of the governmental official and the humanitarian organisation in the 
conflict, Simon is said to have locked the hand pump again, but only two or three times (so 
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 At the time of my stay, they approached a “witch-doctor” in order to find out who was the perpetrator. 
Nevertheless, the traditional healer could not tell them who, as he had to come to the village from a far in 
order to carry out the procedure on-site (they approached him in the village from which Simon originates).  
61
 The councillor was approached two times by Andreas and one time by Petrus, who contacted the 
humanitarian organisation as well.  
62
 This is implied in the Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 from 2002.  
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Andreas). Other external actors such as members of other water committees in other 
villages have yet not been approached by the community members of Okarongo in order to 
intervene in the conflict. The reason for this is that they simply do not know them. This is a 
result of the individual Network Analysis carried out with three committee members in 
Okarongo.63  
For his part, Simon has social connections outside the village with whom he is able 
to obtain help in steering the water conflict in the community. According to the Andreas, 
the Headman managed to bring a more influencing Headman friend of his into the village 
in order to solve the problem with the contributions. This Headman is said to have told the 
community that every household must pay 100N$ monthly in order to maintain the hand 
pump. Nevertheless, so Andreas continued, the villagers objected by saying that the 
proposed amount of money is too high for a contribution. To this, Simon’s peer responded 
saying if they do not like the rules, they must move out of the community. Nonetheless, no 
household has left the community. 
However, Simon has also tried to gain an advantage in the water conflict through 
the legal system.  After having concluded my stay in Okarongo, I came to know during an 
interview with a governmental official in Sesfontein, that Simon was trying to obtain the 
legal ownership over the terrain where the campsite and the water point are located (which, 
in turn, demonstrates that he does not have any documents of ownership over them yet, 
although he had previously suggested such to me). According to the official, the different 
opinions of the traditional authorities have prevented – at least for the moment – that 
Simon obtained the ownership over them. Some Headmen from the same village from 
which Simon originates, so the official, are in support of him with his intentions, but 
another party of mostly Damara authorities are against the proposal, because the campsite 
and the water point are in a communal area and so the legal property of the whole 
community. Later, during the interview, I could understand why Simon wanted to be the 
legal owner of the terrain: the official explained that according to the Namibian law, no 
person might be prevented from drawing water if a water source is located in 
commonage.64 Nevertheless, if the Headman becomes the only owner of the terrain 
involving the water point, then, it is possible the he would be able to prevent his 
neighbours from drawing water from it legally. This, in turn, would imply that the 
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 The participants were one adult son of Petrus (Secretary), one adult daughter from Andreas (Organiser) 
and Joan, the wife of Afrika (Treasurer). 
64
 See Republic of Namibia (2002). 
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villagers’ means of exerting pressure over the Headman could be reduced or may even be 
completely neutralised.  
7.11 Positions and social interactions within the water conflict 
With most of the households, the Conflict Mapping has been accomplished the participants 
described the conflict by arranging cards showing who is having problems with whom. It 
can be noticed that Simon was quite isolated within the water conflict (see Figure 8 below). 
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Figure 8. Visualizations of the conflict according to each Head of HH in Okarongo through the 
Conflict Mapping 
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Mutoto and Josef, declared (generally) that they do not know if there is a water conflict in 
the village, because they are relatively new in the community. For this reason, both of them 
said that they could not participate in this interview. Additionally, Simon, who is one of the 
central figures in the conflict, refused without any further explanation to take part in the 
inquiry. 
A remarkable difference between the charts depicted in the figure above constitutes 
the information given by Afrika. He always declared in several interviews during the 
research activities that there is no water related conflict in Okarongo. During the 
interviews using the Conflict Mapping, he stated that there is no conflict in the community 
and that everyone in the village has a friendly relationship to one another. In his case, as 
already mentioned, I believe that he rather wanted to avoid any accusations about anyone 
either in order to prevent getting somehow involved in the conflict or just because he did 
not want to talk badly of anyone. The presumption that he could not have known anything 
about the conflict is less probable as other members of his household did in fact admit to 
know about the quarrels in the community.   
The other partakers, who participated in this inquiry (Jonas, Uakotora, Petrus and 
Andreas) displayed Simon as an isolated person with whom everyone had trouble with 
within the water conflict.65 However, Jonas, Uakotora and Andreas saw the conflict more 
differentiated than the 29-year-old son of Petrus66, who declared that if there was any water 
related problem, the Headman always stood alone against all other households in the 
village. On the contrary, the other mentioned participants saw certain Heads of household 
as having a neutral position within the conflict, whereas neutrality was defined differently 
by them. Andreas, for example, said that his congener Uakotora remains neutral, because 
he does not contradict the Headman when he puts a lock on the hand pump. According to 
him, Mutoto and Josef also remain neutral in the conflict due to the fact that they have only 
recently settled in the community. Uakotora, considered himself to be neutral, because he – 
in contrast to Jonas, Petrua and Andreas – has paid the Headman a goat for the damages 
caused by his animals in the campsite. Mutoto and Josef were said (by Uakotora) to be 
neutral, because they are also new in the village and Afrika, because he does not have any 
cattle that could cause damages in the camping area. Jonas declared that Afrika and 
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 Compare the respective charts in Figure 8. 
66
 As his father Petrus was absent for many days and the date of his returning was unforeseeable, the 
interview was carried out with him.  
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Uakotora are neutral, because they do not resent Simon for locking the hand pump and he 
affirmed as well that Mutoto and Josef are not part of the water conflict, because they are 
new to the area.  
As depicted in the charts displayed above, Simon and a number of Heads of 
household in the village are conflicted. The respective participants declared the following 
reasons as the principal causes of the conflict among them: The main reason for the 
conflict between the Headman and Jonas, according to the latter, is the fact that he himself 
once broke the lock which was keeping the hand pump unusable for two days. After this, 
Simon was said to have got quite annoyed. The principal reason for the conflict between 
him and Andreas (so the further information of Jonas) was said to be that the latter 
(Andreas) was the first one to have approached a governmental official informing him that 
Simon was locking the hand pump. The conflict between the Headman and Petrus (so the 
last information of Jonas in the interview) was said to be the construction of another water 
point.  
According to Uakotora, as mentioned above, the main reason for the conflict 
between the Headman and the Heads of household depicted is the fact that they did not 
give the Headman any compensation for the damages caused by their respective livestock 
in the campsite.  
For the son of Petrus, however, the main reason for the conflict between the 
Headman and the other Heads of household is the fact that the hand pump belongs to the 
whole community although Simon has affirmed that the water hole is his property alone. 
This statement was also declared by Andreas, but he stated that the conflict was between 
Simon and Afrika, Jonas, Petrus and his own household as the other Heads of household 
remained neutral. 
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In addition to the previous remarks about what 
has been the main reasons for the conflict and 
who is belonging to which party of the conflict, 
it is worthwhile to mention that the Headman 
seems not only to stand alone in the water 
conflict, but also – up to a certain degree – in 
specific social issues. Considering the outcomes 
of the fourth question of the group Network 
Analysis for the Heads of household (Which 
person in this village do you visit for a chat?), it 
could be determined that Simon did not visit 
anyone in the community. In the visualisation of the outcomes of this methodological tool 
in Figure 9 no arrows are going away from the node “Simon”. The two villagers that 
declared visiting him occasionally were Afrika and Uakotora. The first one declared, 
however, that he approached the Headman only to ask him about a 81 year-old woman 
living in his household (the aunt of Simon’s wife), because she once was married with his 
uncle who is now deceased. Uakotora, for his part, declared that he only visited the 
Headman if he wants to get information about funerals that are taking place outside the 
community.67 The persons who do not visit the Headman correspond to all those who 
either have a conflict with him (Jonas, Petrus, Andreas) or those who are new to the village 
(Mutoto and Josef). The two villagers who declared visiting him occasionally (Afrika and 
Uakotora) were regarded as neutral in the water conflict.  
The rest of the Heads of household visit other congeners/ villagers sporadically not 
only for functional reasons, but also for socialising, even if the visits are not always 
reciprocal. To the specific question, why they visit the persons they mentioned, the most 
common answer was because of kinship or friendship (the latter was only mentioned by 
Mutoto referring to Jonas, by Afrika referring to Uakotora and by Uakotora and Petrus in 
reference to each other). Within the village, there are several linkages between the 
households in terms of kinship. Above all, several Heads of household have consanguine 
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 According to several conversations with different villagers, attending a funeral involves more than the 
opportunity to offer personally condolences and support to the close relatives of the deceased. It is the 
occasion to meet relatives and friends, to refresh and upheld important relationships, to inform oneself of the 
situation of other places and people, to talk about business and to negotiate about the heritage.  
 
 
Figure 9. Visiting habits within the Heads 
of  HH  
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Figure 10. Social support (help to 
castrate a young bull) within the 
Heads of HH of Okarongo 
relationships to members of other households.68 The Headman, in contrast, is the only 
Head of household who has relationships to other members of other households only 
through affine relationships.69  
Nevertheless, these specific relationships made it possible for Simon to count on 
help to castrate a young bull. For, he only has one adult son living permanently in the 
community; he is in need of additional persons in order to carry out the mentioned 
procedure. For this, however, he (node “Simon” in Figure 10 bleow) could count on the 
father of his grandson – one of the adult sons of Petrus. Although he and Simon’s daughter  
are not yet married, the young man is often at 
Simon’s household and helps him with other 
activities such as the sale of goats.70 
Besides him, so the Headman, he asks Uakotora 
if he can let his sons help him to hold the young 
bull down while he carries out the castration. In 
this case, Simon does not have any affine 
relationship with Uakotora’s household. 
However, as mentioned above, Uakotora is 
neutral in the conflict and is one of the few 
persons who visit Simon. In addition, it is 
worthwhile to consider the possibility that Uakotora – as the richest man in the community 
and at the same time the most dependent villager on the Headman’s water point in times of 
drought – could have let his sons help Simon in order to demonstrate cooperation and so to 
ascertain for his household the access to water. Uakotora and Petrus respectively, are not 
only asked by Simon for help, but also by other Heads of household. The reason for this is 
that both men have several adult sons living permanently in the community. Uakotora’s 
and Petrus’ households used to support one another in castrating bulls. Afrika’s household, 
the only one owning only goats, is obviously not reliant on others for the issue in 
mention.71  However, it may be relative to affirm that the Headman is fully dependent on 
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 Uakotora is the father of the wives of Jonas and Josef respectively. Afrika is the father of the wife of 
Andreas. The later, in turn, is the older brother of Jonas. Petrus is the older brother of Josef and Mutoto’s 
uncle.  
69
 Simon has an affine relationship to Petrus: his daughter and one of the sons of the Petrus have a one year-
old baby; to Afrika’s household because Ngunoe, his wife, is the sister of Afrika’s wife, Joanand to Andreas 
because Ngunoe is the aunt of Andreas’ wife, Elizabeth.  
70
 During fieldwork, both of them transported five goats to Sesfontein in order to sell them.  
71
 The castration of a goat can be carried out by one person.  
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the help of the above-mentioned households. Although help would be indeed welcome, it 
cannot be ruled out that he could arrange to castrate a young bull only with the help of his 
son. Moreover, it is important to consider that at the time of the fieldwork he – according 
to his own statements – owned only three heads of cattle, which could imply that the 
castration procedure is only seldom necessary.  
A social aspect from which the Headman and his household seem to be isolated is 
within the sharing structures of sugar within the community. The outcomes of the second 
question of the Group Network Analysis for female participants (If you were out of sugar, 
which person(s) in this village would you ask to give you some?) show that Simon’s wife, 
Ngunoe, is the only woman who does not ask anyone for sugar when she is in need (see 
Figure 11 below). Her explanation was that as no one in the community has sugar, she does 
not ask for it anymore. One cannot be assured if other persons denied her the sugar or if  
they really did not have some. It 
is, however, a fact that indeed 
other women ask other 
households for sugar – a sign that 
not all households do not have 
any. Interesting is that her sister 
Joan (Afrika’s wife) and her niece 
Elizabeth (the wife of Andreas) – 
the first one is the mother of the 
second one – seem to be asked commonly by other persons who are not related to them 
through kinship (like Magdalena, Mutoto’s wife and Presilla, the 1st wife of Petrus). 
Furthermore, the only reciprocal relationship in this matter exists between the concerned 
persons. Although the Headman’s household is located between the residencies of both of 
these households. Here it is important to consider that private problems exist between 
Elizabeth (the wife of Andreas) and Ngunoe (the Headman’s wife). These problems could 
not be assessed in detail. However, they do have an impact on the water conflict, as already 
mentioned. Within the context of the sharing structures, it is possible that the concerned 
private issues or conflicts could also have at least a latent repercussion; this although Joan 
and Elizabeth only said that they did not ask Ngunoe for sugar, because she never has any. 
It would be relative to conclude that the Headman’s household is disadvantaged, because 
other households seem to deny his wife sugar. However, it is important to take into 
consideration that the wife of the Headman freely admitted that she prefers driving with 
 
 Figure 11. Structures of sharing (sugar) among the 
households in Okarongo 
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her husband (who owns a car) to the next shop rather than relying on other households in 
the community. Here, like in the issue of castrating bulls, the Headman and his household 
are not totally dependent on other neighbours. They are relatively free to act as they please 
and are thus not in a strong dependence relationship with anyone. 
On the contrary, it seems that other villagers are rather dependent on Simon in 
matters of transport possibilities. As can be recognised in Figure 12 (see bleow), apart from 
his wife, five other women from different households ask him for a lift to go to Sesfontein. 
The outcomes belong to the first question of the group Network Analysis for female 
participants (If you need transport to go to Sesfontein, which person in this village do you 
ask for a lift?). Although some of the women such as Emma, the wife of Jonas and Joan, 
the wife of Afrika mentioned 
other vehicle owners72 as a 
possibility to take a lift, they 
said that they ask Simon more 
often than the others because he, 
in contrast to the others, does 
not leave the community for 
several days or weeks. Thus 
during certain periods of time, 
he is the only person who they can ask for a lift. As it can be noticed in the figure, even 
Naipera, the 2nd wife of Uakotora asked Simon to take her along because his husband 
spends a long time outside Okarongo. The respective wives of Mutoto and Josef – both 
members of the newest households in the community – declared that they never ask anyone 
for a lift. Nevertheless, during my stay I observed that they were brought out of the 
community at least one time in the vehicle from Uakotora. Simon benefits from these 
situations, as the interviewed women (all depicted in Figure 12) explained that he charges 
them between 30N$ and 50N$ for taking them along. In such cases when he is asked to 
drive to Sesfontein without having a personal necessity to do so, he charges 300N$ or 
400N$ (the price of a middle-size or tall goat). Andreas, another car-owner, does not 
charge, according to the women who ask him for a lift. It is important to consider that the 
concerned women are his relatives. 
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 Josef drives the car for his uncle, Uakotora. The NGO also sometimes offers the possibility of transport, as 
some workers with a pick-up from the organisation used to visit the job location in Okarongo.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Instrumental support (in matters of transport) 
got by the wives of the Heads of HH of Okarongo 
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In the case of the Heads of household, the 
situation of instrumental support in matters of 
transport is quite different. There is only one Head 
of household, Petrus, who refers to Simon as the 
person he asks for a lift in order to go to 
Sesfontein (see Figure 13). However, Petrus 
usually asks Uakotora (the “richest” villager in 
Okarongo) for this purpose as well. Thus Petrus 
seems not to be totally dependent on Simon. 
Uakotora is also commonly asked by Jonas and Josef, who usually drives the car for his 
uncle, who is the car owner. According to Jonas, Uakotora charges between 30N$ and 
40N$ for taking people along, but having to pay is rather the exception. The occasion that 
Uakotora was asked to drive to Sesfontein without having to go there for personal reasons 
has not occurred yet. So it could not be assessed if he would charge them (like Simon does, 
300 N$ or more) for taking them along.  
The Headman, for his part, tries to avoid using his car as much as he can, because 
his vehicle is not very reliable, according to his own declaration. Hence, he prefers instead 
to ask Andreas (who lives relatively close to his household) for a lift every time he 
(Andreas) is driving to Sesfontein and has space in the load bed (his car is the smallest in 
the village). For the lift, Simon usually does not have to pay. Andreas, on his part, being 
the administrator of the NGO based in the community, it is sometimes possible to take the 
car of the NGO when employees visit Okarongo.  
Afrika, whose household is the poorest one in the community, usually travels with 
the donkey-cart to Sesfontein. Only in seldom cases, does he ask Andreas, with whom he 
has an affine relationship, for a lift. Mutoto, the Head of the newest household in the 
community, said that he walks to the main road and waits for a lift, although they do not 
pass by frequently. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Instrumental support (in 
matters of transport) got by the 
Heads of HH of Okarongo 
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8 Discussion 
8.1 The conflict as a bargaining process  
As already outlined in section 1.2, the approach of Knight is in this paper the theoretical 
framework used to analyse and explain the situation found in Okarongo. As noted there, 
the author conceptualizes institutional development and change as a by-product of a 
bargaining game over substantive social outcomes determined by the parties’ relative 
abilities (i.e. bargaining powers) to establish rules (constraining the actions of others), that 
structure outcomes to those equilibria most favourable to them (Knight 1992: 126ff).  
The conflict in Okarongo, can be interpreted as a bargaining game in process 
between several actors with differing needs/interests and bargaining powers over 
distributional benefits regarding the access to water. This process was not specifically 
characterized by a situation of verbal offers and counteroffers within the framework of a 
water committee or community meeting, but shaped through principally by a range of 
diverse practices out of these participative forums.73 The interpretation of the conflict as a 
bargaining game in process is based on the fact that the circumstances were shaped by a 
sequence of actions and counteractions without a more or less clear ‘winner’ or stable 
(equilibrium) outcome, that is, a situation, in which the one or the other actor had to accept 
the actions of the antagonist because he couldn’t do better than to do so (ibid.). At first 
glance, one could say that the conflict as such is indeed structuring or regulating the 
practices of access and usage of water in the community, but except for the time during 
which the hand pump remains locked (as a rule one to three days), the villagers do not 
radically change their water fetching or animal watering practices in its context. In other 
words, the conflict as such is not producing a set of rules i.e. institutions structuring or 
regulating the access and usage of water. While the hand pump remains locked, the 
villagers draw water from the first water point (although the water is not very clean) and 
they also have the possibility of using the natural water fountains for their animals. During 
the dry season, these households come more regularly to Simon’s water point, although 
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 Here, it has to be pointed out that the physical participation at community meetings or committee reunions 
does not necessarily imply that ‘real’ participation is guaranteed. Differences in gender, age or social position 
can lead to the fact that their opinions or interests are not listened to. Furthermore, as Cleaver (2001) 
explains, decision-making is not necessarily located only within the frameworks of a committee anyway. 
Often, consultations take place within families regarding matters of livestock welfare, grazing, etc. since they 
use to herd livestock as well. In Okarongo, this could also be the case although there is no functioning water 
committee: the children often bring the animals to the water point or natural water fountains principally in 
consultation with their father.   
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frictions with him are pre-programmed. Simon tries constantly through several strategies to 
constrain others in such a way as to secure his preferred alternative, which is to impede 
them from using his water point as much as possible, above all from watering their animals 
in times of drought, or even to bring them to leave the community.74 However, Simon’s 
pretentions are constantly blocked by the villagers, who continually find ways to 
counteract his attempts to deny them access to the water, (although they are legitimated to 
use the water point since the hand pump over it was donated to the community as a whole). 
The factions within the conflict have then relatively the equal bargaining power (based on 
several bargaining resources) in the struggle of defending their respective needs/interests 
regarding the usage of the water point. 
The achievement of collective goals, a central premise from Ostrom (1990) as a 
motivation for collective action is in contrast not a pronounced characteristic of the 
described situation in Okarongo. Primarily because Simon, the Headman, does not have 
the disposition of compromising with others, whereby herewith he dismisses the possibility 
that his water needs could also be covered if he entered into a less conflictual relationship 
with the other households or negotiated with them in order to initiate formal institutions to 
regulate the water points’ usage.  
8.2 The actors’ bargaining strategies and resources 
In order to push his interests through, Simon uses concrete strategies such as locking the 
hand pump or threatening to lock it. However, he also has other bargaining resources. He 
draws on mechanisms provided by the Namibian legal system in order to steer the conflict, 
like pursuing to obtain the legal ownership over the campsite and the water point. With 
this, he seems to be pursuing the entitlement to obtain compensation in cases of damage to 
the campsite and also prevent his neighbours legally from drawing water. Here it becomes 
clear that, as Lund stated, “National laws and government institutions constitute an 
environment for local politics and important local players within it” (Lund 2007: 21).  
Additionally, Simon has used resources within the customary political fabric in 
order to gain an advantage in the dispute: the contact to traditional authorities of other 
villages. If we remember, Simon, as the Headman of Okarongo brought another more 
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 Maybe except for Afrika’s household, which has few animals and with which Simon used to share the 
water point before. Possibly, Simon is further tolerating Andreas’ household, the one representing the NGO, 
which, in turn, is paying him for the water. The rest of households that came into the village, because of their 
work at the NGO were from the beginning not welcomed by the Headman since – assuming that Simon told 
the truth – it had not been agreed upon that they would come and settle in the village with their animals and 
use his water point.  
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influential Headman he knew from the village from which he originates, into the conflict in 
order to tell the villagers to either financially contribute on a monthly basis for the hand 
pump’s maintenance or to move out of the community.  
Another important practice or strategy implemented by Simon is the use of 
discourses. His assertions of being the owner of the water point and the legitimate ruler of 
the community can be interpreted as a way to legitimate his actions in the conflict (locking 
the hand pump without consulting the community, telling villagers to leave the village, 
among others) and so to assure his access to the water. Even the discourse of witchcraft 
can also be seen as a bargaining resource based on cultural beliefs about supernatural 
powers. Although the Headman takes a risk in accusing persons of practising witchcraft 
against his household (because in the case of a wrong accusation, his household could 
among others become a victim of social isolation and accused of defamation), these 
general accusations can be used as a potential tool of attack. By announcing it publicly, he 
puts the community under general suspicion, which can be understood as a mechanism of 
intimidation and as an attempt to reinforce his role as a victim in the conflict.  
However, as already mentioned, some villagers also have resources to counteract 
the Headman’s strategies. They also use the state institutions to influence the conflict: the 
councillor of Sesfontein has been approached several times so he could warn Simon about 
the unlawfulness of his actions. In contrast to Simon, however, they seem not to have 
personally approached any traditional authorities to have an influence in the conflict, not 
even in order to inform them about his actions. They have rather directly approached the 
governmental official in mention.75   
In addition to this, they, as well as Simon, use the recourse of discourses to 
undermine their counterparts. They do not recognize Simon as their legitimate ruler and 
above all Jonas even affirmed that Simon was not the only one who dug the water hole. In 
sustaining the prior, the Headman’s actions thus become unjustified and arbitrary while at 
the same time the villagers so create by this means a discursive argument that empowers 
them to still use the water point since the person denying them the access to water does not 
have any formal authority to do so. What concrete strategies the villagers utilize in order to 
counteract Simon’ accusations of being a victim of witchcraft remained unknown due to 
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 The reason why they have as of yet not contacted the Chiefs, who are supposedly the legitimate rulers of 
the community, remains unclear. Possibly, the villagers trust the governmental official or rather the judiciary 
more than their traditional authorities. The thought underlying this supposition is that some cases of 
corruption and impartiality among certain traditional authorities have been recorded through informal 
conversations with persons from in Okarongo and in Sesfontein.  
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the difficult study accessibility of this phenomenon. Probably more time in the field would 
have contributed to gaining the deeper trust of the villagers in order to find out more about 
this topic in general. 
8.3 Bargaining more than needs and interests  
One important aspect to be mentioned is that besides the differing needs or interests 
regarding the access and use of water, the conflict involved a more fundamental, but at the 
same time less tangible issue. Through Participant Observation, I could record that sharing 
food was a common practice not only in Okarongo, but also in other visited communities. 
After having cooked, for example, it was as a matter of course that visitors (principally 
neighbours) were allowed to take maize porridge out of the pot from which the household 
members were eating. It happened similarly even after having slaughtered a goat or sheep: 
visitors were offered a piece of meat by the Head of household or his wife and in some 
cases, the meat was even brought personally to a neighboured homestead despite its high 
value.76 Concerning water, it appears to occur in a similar manner. In Okarongo – as well 
as in other visited communities – it was self-evident to offer visitors (also mostly co-
villagers) water to drink or they just served themselves a cup of it from a container often 
without asking for it previously. Concerning the natural water fountains in the research 
setting, for example, it is taken for granted that the water collected from them is for all, 
regardless of who found the fountains first. In another visited community it was recorded 
that its habitants have scruples denying persons – walking on their way with their animals 
– from drawing water from their water point, even if this meant “loosing” water. Although 
the villagers pay water fees for pumping water, they said that they could not deny passing-
by persons and their animals from drinking even if they are not able to pay for it, because it 
is simply not the ‘right thing’ to do. Asking my interpreter if sharing water in the region 
was something evident, expected and frowned upon when denied, such as was in the case 
of the food, he answered affirmatively. Sharing water, just as sharing food, is a social 
embedded institution i.e. an institution based on culture and daily practice (Cleaver 2002: 
13). In the conflict of Okarongo, the validity of this institutional practice is at play or rather 
raised into question.  
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 As noted above, the animals have a relatively high value for their owners. For this reason, the animals are 
not regularly used for the household consumption. However, if an animal is slaughtered for this cause indeed, 
it is a goat or a sheep. The cows are slaughtered principally at important events, like funerals or marriages.  
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8.4 The fear of water scarcity 
Notably, the Headman’s conduct (in comparison to the rest of the villagers) is the most in 
discordance with the behavioural pattern implied in the institution described above. Among 
the reasons for him locking the hand pump (or rather to act against the institution), 
explicitly displayed in the description of the conflict, there is one fundamental factor that 
may have been overlooked. There are indications that the environmental uncertainty 
(Mehta et. al. 1999) is an implicit, but important impetus of his actions or rather his general 
attitude towards his neighbours.  
If we remember, Jonas and his wife declared that the Headman locks the hand 
pump out of fear that the people working for the NGO and their livestock could finish the 
water, which he in turn needs for his campsite. They are the only two villagers that 
mentioned this reason in connection with Simon’s action of locking the hand pump. He 
himself never explicitly expressed that he locks the hand pump for this reason. Although it 
was implicitly stated that he fears water scarcity could occur if other households and their 
animals were to use his water point permanently. If we recall the first interview with him 
(the first time Okarongo was visited), he only expressed his general preoccupation that 
there were too many people settled in the area using his water point considering that the 
water beneath it might be scarce.  
The fact, however, that the frictions with Simon regarding water usage at his water 
point increased during the dry season – when less water could be drawn at his water point 
– is an indication that the variability and unpredictability of the water availability at his 
water point shapes to a great extent his behaviour towards his co-villagers and so therefore 
plays a significant role in the situation in Okarongo regarding the water access and use. 
Linked to this issue is the economic heterogeneity. In the literature, it is commonly 
argued that this factor above all makes cooperative arrangements around the management 
of natural resources difficult (cf. Adhikari/ Lovett 2006). The situation in Okarongo seems 
to reinforce this argument at least to a certain extent. If we recall, at the beginning Simon 
was only sharing the water point with Afrika’s household. This is a household with which 
he, Simon, holds an affine relationship and from which he apparently has indeed received 
help in the past to dig the water hole, but it is also a household characterized as being 
“poor” in terms of owning animals, which implies low water consumption. In this 
situation, therefore, he didn’t have to worry that water at his water point could be extracted 
in great quantities, that is, that his access to water could be seriously threatened. This can 
be reinforced through the fact that there are no signs that disputes have taken place 
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between Simon and Afrika regarding water. Afterwards, however, if we consider the 
course of the conflict, the problems concerning the water point began and intensified when 
more and more households settled in the community and became entitled to use Simon’s 
water point (as the pump over it was donated by the humanitarian organisation to the 
whole community). These (few) newly settled households are not as “poor” as Afrika’s 
household (and as the Headman’s) and the majority of them have far more animals than he 
does, above all cattle, which implicates a potential increment of water consumption in the 
community. Surely, it cannot be completely ruled out that the conflict would have 
developed in a less problematic manner, had these newly settled households been as “poor” 
as Simon. Nevertheless, it can also be supposed that he would not have been that worried 
about the overuse of his water point, had the newly settled households been in possession 
of significantly less animals. Hence, the uncertainty of water availability at his water point 
together with the economic differences between the households, are (the later again, maybe 
only to a certain extent) inducing the Headman to not enter a cooperative relationship with 
the majority of his neighbours. 
8.5 The Headman’s costs of locking the hand pump  
It is important to consider that Simon persists in maintaining a non-cooperative attitude 
towards his neighbours not only because of the fear of water scarcity being too high, or 
because he always finds a way to impose or to defend his interests (i.e. through his 
bargaining strategies and resources), but also because the costs of locking the hand pump 
are relatively low for him and his household despite the conflict. According to Knight, the 
“breakdown values” are the actor’s costs of ‘non coordination on an equilibrium outcome’ 
(Knight 1992: 129ff). If the “breakdown value” of an individual is high, then he has less to 
lose in case of failing to cooperate or to achieve an agreement with the other interested 
parties. This seems to be the case in this situation considering social relations.77 Although 
it is true that the Headman is only visited by two of his neighbours (the only two neutral 
actors in the conflict) for functional reasons, he is still not fully isolated or dependent from 
other villagers in other spheres of social life. He can count on help for castrating a young 
bull and is able to dispense with the sharing structures in the community despite the 
conflict. In the first case, affine relationships to another household (to Petrus’ household) 
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 From a psychological perspective, in contrast, it is indeed possible that locking the hand pump can 
constitute a cost for Simon. Through his actions, he is not exactly gaining the friendship and sympathy of his 
neighbours nor cultivating a good reputation. Furthermore, the councillor of Sesfontein has become aware of 
the arbitrary manner of his actions. Indeed, all of these issues could be a matter of concern for the Headman.   
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enable him to get help to conduct the castration procedure. In this matter another head of 
household (Uakotora) appears to also offer him his help, possibly to demonstrate 
cooperation and so to ascertain the access to water for his animals during the dry season.78 
Regarding the independence of transport facilities, Simon maintains a freedom of action in 
light of the fact that other households (inclusive the ones with which he holds an affine 
relationship) seem not to be willing (independent of the reason) to give his wife sugar (and 
probably other food provisions), because they have the means to go to the next shop with 
their own vehicle if they are in need of something. This means that if we conceptualize 
dependence relationships in terms of power (Emerson 1962) the Headman is rather 
‘powerful’ due to his independence from others.79  Furthermore, other villagers (mostly the 
wives of other heads of household) are rather dependant on Simon’s will to take them 
along with his car, since he, in contrast to the other car owners, does not leave the 
community for several days or weeks at a time. To this, it is important to mention, that the 
visitors at his campsite (sporadically) bring him material benefits that his neighbours 
possibly cannot offer him. The students who stayed for four weeks in his camping-place, 
for example, helped him not only with its amelioration, but also with giving him food 
supplies and even with money donations, as I was able to record through conversations 
with Simon’s adult son. Moreover, other tourists that stayed in the campsite during the 
research activities gave him medicine and offered to bring two of his adult children to 
Sesfontein.80 This makes him a bit more independent from the material profits of social 
relationships in the village. 
Nevertheless, an important additional argument for why the costs of locking the 
hand pump have remained relatively low for the Headman is that the other villagers have 
the tendency of avoiding an escalation of the situation. For example, the Heads of other 
households could have collectively demanded that Simon must leave the community or 
could have denied him the use of the water point, which he has assured to be his own. 
However, the Heads of households did not voice such demands. Naturally, it cannot be 
denied that the existence of the natural water fountains surely helps to avoid that all 
households depend on one water point and that therefore, the frictions between them are 
less frequent. Nevertheless, the rather defensive attitude of the villagers (since they 
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 Naturally, herewith the possibility that Uakotora helped Simon without having any further intentions other 
than being kind, cannot be completely ruled out.  
79
 Following Emerson (1962), the more dependent an individual is on a social relationship, the less power 
that individual actually possesses. 
80
 This information is based on conversations with the travellers themselves.  
94 
 
primarily respond to the actions of the Headman) can be taken as a strong sign that norms 
of conflict avoidance are widespread in the community and that therefore the potential of 
finding a solution for the conflict is definitely existent. 
8.6 Locking the hand pump: an exercise of power? 
If we remember, Simon seems not only to lock the hand pump because he is worried about 
the water beneath his water point, but also because he instrumentalizes the hand pump in 
order to solve disputes besides water issues. He locks the hand pump in order to punish the 
villagers, whose cattle caused damages in his campsite and also to settle private problems 
with members of other households. At first glance, however, one could affirm that with 
these actions the Headman is exercising his power. Nevertheless, on closer examination of 
the dependence relationships in terms of power (Emerson 1962) but from the villagers’ 
perspective, it can be determined that this impression is rather relative and that the 
Headman, at most, is attempting to exercise power. At first sight, the majority of the 
households in the community appear to be dependent on the water point, which Simon 
assured to be his thus they are dependent on him also. Nevertheless, they have the 
alternative to use the natural water fountains and to draw water from the first water point as 
a last resort if the Headman locks the hand pump independent of the reason for him doing 
so.81 However, Simon – who was not able to go to the natural water fountains due to the 
distance – was reliant upon their willingness to pay the money contributions in order to 
maintain the water pump (this, assuming that the money the NGO was paying him monthly 
was really not enough for this purpose).82 During the dry season the situation is similar. 
When the water at the natural fountains becomes scarce, the households that use the natural 
water fountains are forced to use Simon’s water point in the village. At this point, if Simon 
locks the hand pump, then the households in mention are more affected. Nonetheless, if 
Simon locks the hand pump, the villagers draw on strategies such as the ones described 
above in order to counteract him and so the bargaining game continues. In the light of 
these circumstances, then, it turns out to be quite relative, which actor exercises power 
over whom. The opposing parties were, depending on the situation, dependent or 
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 Afrika’s household is far away from the natural water fountains, but has three tanks with each 200 Liter 
capacity to store water, which are also usually kept relatively full. So, if Simon locks the hand pump, the 
household members and animals can rely on these water reserves for a couple of days.  
82
 Simon could not count on the help from the only son living permanently in the village to take the animals 
far away, since he refuses to help him with the farming activities. He helps him only with the administration 
of the campsite, that is, to welcome the tourists and to arrange the overnight stay with them.   
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independent from each other and in case of dependency implementing bargaining 
strategies to counterbalance the state of affairs.   
8.7 Interdependency of water and land use  
Although Simon justifies locking the hand pump in the context of the overgrazing 
problems in the immediate surroundings of the community as a necessary evil to the 
benefit of the community in general (because so, the villagers would be forced to bring 
their animals to other areas to graze), there are reasons for the assumption that herewith he 
follows principally his own interests. Due to the overgrazing problems, he has to cover 
longer distances between the water point and suitable grazing areas. In contrast, the 
majority of the other villagers are used to bring their animals to the natural water fountains 
to graze and are also used to support one another in this task. However, Simon holds an 
interest in his animals being able to graze preferably close to the water point as he cannot 
count on support from others to bring his livestock much further away and therefore he is 
dependent only on his own water fountain. If we assume for a moment, that all households 
were dependent only on Simon’s water point and that the natural water fountains were non-
existent, the circumstances in Okarongo regarding the overgrazing problems may be surely 
more tensioned. In this fictive situation, all households would be forced to go further away 
from the community to graze their animals and to come back to the village to water them. 
(Not to mention that, under these conditions, the villagers would be quite affected by the 
Headman’s actions). In communities in which this situation is habitual, is to say that there 
is only one water point in the village, then the interdependency between land and water 
usage would be in such a case even more obvious. As showed for Okarongo, this 
interconnection was heating up the conflict although not all villagers were being seriously 
affected by the overgrazing problems near the water point. In communities, in which the 
water point in the village is the only water fountain, therefore, it is to be expected that the 
bargaining game among users can be even more tense and the role of power 
correspondingly, even more prominent. All in all, at this place it can be stressed that failing 
institutions regarding the water management can have a negative influence on the use of 
land and vice versa. In order to avoid tensions or even conflicts, then, the communities 
have to face the challenge to develop ‘bifunctional institutions’ i.e. institutions regulating 
the land and water use as well.   
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8.8 Okarongo: a case of institutional failure?  
In the literature, the term institutional failure is commonly linked to the denotation of those 
situations in which actors using a common pool resource have failed in crafting 
collectively formal institutions for a sustainable management of that resource i.e. to avoid 
resource damage or overexploitation (Ostrom 1990; Acheson 2006). In the described case 
study, the villagers are not only not implementing the rules for the water points, they are 
also not renegotiating them and so the conflict as such, as already mentioned, is not 
decisively structuring the practices of water fetching and animal watering among the 
villagers. However, in the case of Simon’s water point, it is difficult to affirm if the water 
beneath it is truly overused by the villagers due to the lack of institutional arrangements. 
All indications point to the water scarcity at his water point (in terms of less water coming 
out from the hand pump and not that water could not be pumped up at all) being seasonally 
dependent. However, it cannot be ruled out that the water captured in the underground 
during the rainy season, would last through the dry period without any kind of bottlenecks, 
if the water point was used even less intensively (since the majority of the households are 
already mainly using the natural water fountains for their animals unless during the dry 
season). Being so, then, the problem seems to lie indeed in the lack of clear boundaries 
regarding the settlement in the village and in the lack of arrangements concerning who can 
use how much of the water resources.  
Apart from this, it cannot be affirmed with certainty that Simon is impeding the 
drying up of his water point by locking the hand pump. The number of times he has 
already locked the hand pump could not be established. The number of days the pump 
remained locked, however, could be established. This was between one and four days. The 
de facto impact of these actions on the resource in the short and the long term is unknown. 
In case of being effectively so, that is to say that the Headman was impeding the drying up 
of the water point by his actions of locking the pump, then, Okarongo, could be therefore 
an example in which collective action problems regarding the sustainable management of 
natural resources at the local level were being solved through an authoritarian way.  
A similar conclusion can be formulated concerning the natural water fountains. It 
cannot be assured with accuracy whether these fountains would supply more water during 
the dry seasons if the users were to develop institutional conventions leading to a less 
intensive use of them in general, for example, through reducing the number of users or the 
use practices. A fact is, however, that at the end, no household in the community really 
experiences any kind of serious adversities due to water shortages (no villager declared 
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that any animals have died of thirst, for example). Nevertheless, if more households were 
to settle in the community, this figure would probably change since the strategy of using 
the Headman’s water point as an alternative for the water scarcity at the natural fountains 
would lead to the drain of the water point. Then, enough water would not be available, 
neither at the water fountains nor at the Headman’s water point, thus creating an 
immensely challenging situation for the community. 
8.9 Ostrom and Knight: two different or two complementary theoretical 
frameworks? 
After having analysed the circumstances found in the research setting by means of 
Knight’s bargaining theory of institutions (Knight 1992) and after having shown that the 
achievement of collective goals was not the motivation for collective action in Okarongo 
as Ostrom predicts (Ostrom 1990), in this section it is pursued to discuss which of the two 
approaches can explain reality better and if and to what extent both approaches can 
complement one another. 
The circumstances described in Okarongo, namely how institutions were being 
developed, were an empirical evidence of the predictions formulated in Knight’s 
theoretical framework. But still, is this approach having a general validity to explain how 
institutions emerge and change regarding the management of natural resources? And what 
about Ostrom’s theoretical framework of institutional choice, is it just an idealised way – 
in terms of oversimplifying social reality overlooking the role of power – to predict human 
behaviour in the context of natural resource management? Let me answer these questions 
beginning with the ones concerning Ostrom’s model. 
Although Okarongo’s case shows, that Ostrom’s framework disregards the role of 
power when institutions are negotiated – as remarked by several critics –, it is still 
important to point out that her approach has been developed through an inductive way, i.e. 
it is based on several empirically studied cases around the world. In other words: although 
her institutional choice framework is not reliable when applied to explain the 
circumstances like in Okarongo, it is still scientifically valid because it can predict how 
individuals behave in the case studies, from which the theory itself was developed. 
Consequently, however, the approach can only be applied to explain circumstances in the 
field when a certain prerequisite is met. This prerequisite is that individuals follow a 
straightforward behaviour. Only then, Ostrom’s theoretical framework with all its 
components will be suitable to explain institutional development. 
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On the other hand, regarding Knight’s theory something similar can be stated: his 
theory takes a basic assumption as a starting point, namely that actors behave in a self-
interested strategic manner seeking those institutional rules that give them the greatest 
share of benefits. If it is found indeed in the fields, that individual have this attitude (like in 
Okarongo), then his framework will be suitable for explaining the consequent situations in 
the setting. But if actors are willing to share equally the costs of their agreements and to 
contribute to collective benefits (like in Ostrom’s study cases) Knight’s approach would 
then not be the suitable theoretical tool for the analysis. Both theories have in principle a 
high explanatory power but only if certain fundamental conditions are there as a 
prerequisite.  
At this point the question arises if and to what extent the two approaches can 
complement one another. Schematically, however, an attempt to add the element of power 
from Knight in Ostrom’s framework of institutional choice demands clear modifications in 
its component parts (compare Figure 14 and Figure 15 on pages 96-97)83: 
 
 
                                                 
 
83
 The reason why Ostrom’s theoretical scheme has been taken as a basis to include Kinght’s theoretical 
components is because Knight doesn’t offer a graphical representation of his framework.  It is then, so to say, 
because of practicability reasons.  
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Due to the condition in Knight’s approach based on individual opportunistic behaviour, the 
first changes in Ostrom’s framework occur at the level of the assessment of benefits and 
costs: the individual won’t make a weighting of advantages and disadvantages about the 
consequences of implementing a new rule for him and the other resource holders as a more 
or less homogeneous entity. The individual would rather consider if another rule would 
give him personally a more favourable distribution of the benefits or not. In case that the 
individual sees indeed an advantage for him through changing a rule and he has also 
enough bargaining power to push his own interests through, then, a change in the rules will 
occur after the bargaining game with the other resource users. In Ostrom’s framework, in 
turn, it is implied that institutional change occurs democratically between resource users 
after the assessment of benefits and costs for them as an entity. The two different ways of 
assuming human behaviour (i.e. the respective conditions in Figure 14 and Figure 15) by 
Knight and Ostrom respectively make it very difficult to combine both frameworks. An 
individual cannot be willing to cooperate with others and at the same time be disposed to 
force others to act in ways contrary to their preferences. These are two kinds of attitudes 
that simply cannot complement one another. 
8.10 Suggestions for future research 
Probably, this theoretical problem of combining both theories cannot be solved, but I think, 
however, that both approaches could be extended.  They explain little about which are the 
specific (social) circumstances that actually bring or impede individuals in a specific 
situation to cooperate with each other, to use their power against one another or even to 
cooperate with one another without using their power against them (although the 
individuals could do so) .  
In this paper it has been tried to interprete, above all, why the Headman didn’t want 
to enter a cooperative relationship with his neighbours. The stated reasons for his 
behaviour have been attributed to diverse factors somehow intertwined with each other: the 
environmental uncertainty (i.e. the fear of water scarcity) combined with the fact that he 
was relatively independent and not being (strongly) related with his neighbours. 
Specifically these two last mentioned factors brought him to a position in which he didn’t 
have much to lose when he was trying to push through his interests against others’ even if 
thereby he was breaking social norms (like the sharing of water). On the other hand, it has 
been stated that the other community members haven’t collectively demanded that the 
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Headman should leave the community nor have they impede him the use of the water 
point, although they would have had the power to do so. First, because they were still 
having the possibility of using other water fountains and second, because they didn’t want 
the conflict to escalate even more (norms of conflict avoidance). 
Therefore, more generalized and reliable assertions could be made about what 
actually induces individuals in the context of CPR management to enter cooperative or 
conflictive relationships with each other by identifying and comparing the circumstances in 
several case studies that bring individuals to act in a certain manner.  
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9 Conclusion 
The main focus of the project underlying this paper was to gain a detailed impression from 
an anthropological perspective of how the communities in Namibia were dealing with the 
development of institutional arrangements for the water access and usage in the context of 
relatively recent legal developments promoting the common based management of this 
resource. In the village chosen for this investigation, the realization of the research 
objectives turned out to be a great methodological challenge, since the access to certain, 
and above all reliable information proved to be very difficult due to the impacts of my 
fieldwork role(s) in the tensioned social fabric of the community as well as due to the 
effects of entered relationships within the same. Nevertheless, despite of the difficulties 
that stationary fieldwork or rather participant observation brought along, in several 
occasions it was a proper tool to get an insight into everyday life within the setting, to 
understand discrepancies between how the participants described their behaviour and how 
they then actually behaved. 
Basing on the fieldwork findings, which denoted a situation of intricate conflict in 
the research setting, the theoretical objective of this paper was to analyse the role of power 
in the development of institutions by means of a theoretical construct that has seldom, or 
not at all, been applied to examine communal water resource management affairs: Knight´s 
bargaining theory of institutional development. Critics of widespread concepts of 
communal resource management have not attempted yet to examine power by means of a 
theoretical framework, although they pointed out its outstanding role in the development of 
institutions. For the case study in this paper, Knight’s approach proved to be a useful 
theoretical tool of analysis, as he conceptualizes the development of institutions as a by-
product of the process of seeking distributional advantage over substantive benefits by 
means of bargaining power (which was the situation in the research setting) and not as the 
product of the efforts to obtain collective benefits (as commonly suggested for the 
development of institutions at the local level resource management).  
Concretely, by reference to Knight´s approach, it could be determined that the 
situation in Okarongo reflects a bargaining game in process as the interest parties are 
counteracting repeatedly (excepting maybe the neutral actors) through different bargaining 
resources and strategies the attempt of the opponent to structure the access to the water 
point. The specific tactics which the actors in the village implement to impose or defend 
their interests or needs regarding the access to water are multi-layered. Besides concrete 
actions like locking the hand pump (or breaking the lock in return), the actors draw on 
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mechanisms provided by the Namibian legal system and by the customary political fabric. 
Furthermore they make recourse to different kinds of discourses, some of them related to 
cultural beliefs, like witchcraft.  
From the perspective of the most conspicuous actor in the conflict, i.e. the 
Headman, who was acting substantially in discordance with the widespread social 
embedded institution (Cleaver 2002) of sharing water in the region and in the village, it has 
been attempted in the scope of this work to analyse the factors motivating his attitude 
towards his co-villagers. At this, it could be identified that the fear of water scarcity 
appeared to be an important impetus for his behaviour. This fear, in turn, appeared to be 
shaped by the environmental uncertainty (Mehta et. al. 1999) and by the fact that new 
settled households were having significantly more animals than he had. At this place, it has 
been postulated (with reservation, however) that the economic heterogeneity – a factor 
commonly seen as the impediment for cooperative arrangements (cf. Adhikari/ Lovett 
2006) – was restraining the Headman’s cooperative behaviour, since his interests or needs 
regarding water were being potentially threatened by the “rich” newcomers.  
The reason why the Headman can persist in maintaining a non-cooperative 
relationship with the majority of his neighbours was clarified by analysing his “breakdown 
values” i.e. the costs of failing to cooperate or to achieve an agreement with the other 
interested parties (Knight 1992: 129ff). In the context of the conflict, the Headman is not 
bearing high costs for his attitude, since he is not being fully isolated or dependent on other 
villagers. This independency from the relationship of others confers the Headman power 
(Emerson 1962). However, an important aspect has to be added in relation to this matter, 
namely, that the villagers are having a rather defensive attitude towards the Headman’s 
actions. This is contributing significantly not only to the fact that the consequences for the 
Headman are remaining low, but also to the fact that the situation in general has not 
escalated more. Against this background, the villagers´ attitude can be taken as a strong 
sign that norms of conflict avoidance are widespread in the community and that therefore 
the potential of finding a solution for the conflict is definitely existent. 
Subsequently, it has been analysed from the villagers´ perspective if the Headman was 
exercising power on them every time he was locking the hand pump. The result of this 
examination was quite relative. The opposing parties were, depending on the situation, 
dependent on or independent from each other and in case of dependency implementing 
bargaining strategies to counterbalance the state of affairs.  
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To the end of the analysis two issues have been problematized: the challenge of making 
institutional arrangements involving both, water and land use, and the question if the 
community was damaging the water resources due to the lack of formal institutions. In 
relation to the first aspect, it has been stressed that the communities (probably not only 
Okarongo) have to face the challenge to develop ‘bifunctional institutions’ i.e. institutions 
that regulate the land and the water use likewise in order to avoid tensions or even 
conflicts, since they influence each other directly. Regarding the second issue, it could not 
be established with accuracy if Okarongo was a case of institutional failure, that is to say, a 
case in which the water resources were getting overexploited due to the lack of institutional 
arrangements among users. Concerning the water point in the village for example, there 
were strong indications that the water scarcity at it, was seasonally dependent. The 
question if this water scarcity could have been better managed by using the water point less 
intensively in general through user boundaries and usage regulations, remained unclear. 
Regarding the natural water fountains the question also remained open whether they 
supplied enough water during the dry season, if the villagers would have had developed 
usage regulations for the use of water.  
In the concluding section of the discussion part, it has been discussed whether 
Ostrom’s or Knight’s approach can better explain reality and if to what extent both 
approaches can complement one another. There, it has been concluded that both theories 
have in principle a high explanatory power but only if applied when certain fundamental 
conditions (i.e. if the individuals have an opportunistic or a cooperative attitude 
respectively) are there as prerequisite. Subsequently, because of the strong differing 
assumptions of individual rational action, it has been shown that both theories cannot 
complement each other. Nevertheless it has been formulated that both approaches have the 
potential to be respectively extended as they explain little about which are the specific 
(social) circumstances that actually bring individuals to cooperate with each other, to use 
their power against others or to cooperate with others without using their power against 
them although they could do so. 
The case study presented in this paper showed that for future empirical research in 
Namibia, it should be taken into account that the social reality of the communities can be 
more complex than mainstream communal natural resource management theory assumes. 
Besides power, environmental uncertainties and the economic heterogeneity can be 
important factors influencing the development of cooperation among users.  Okarongo, 
however, should obviously not be taken as a general reflection of the general situation in 
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Namibia concerning how the communities are dealing with the regulation of the water 
access and usage in the context of the recent water reform. To give a more sustained 
judgment on this matter, further detailed studies are necessary.84 Nevertheless, one 
important insight provided by Okarongo is, that ideas of CBNRM, like constituting a 
committee in which users can participate in developing rules, can encounter settings with a 
history of tensions, in which such measures may not easily gain a foothold. Possibly a 
periodical monitoring of the communities would help to avoid situations or problems like 
the ones registered in Okarongo, where the water committee was not functioning and rules 
were not being negotiated. Nonetheless, in this case the water reform would lose its main 
purpose: to give the communities the autonomy to regulate the water resources they use. 
However, I believe that the communities just need time to get used to this situation of 
autonomy and that cases like Okarongo are simply in a process of learning.   
Finally, although the presented case study may not be generalized for other 
communities elsewhere, this paper shows specifically that power – in terms of bargaining 
power, i.e. bargaining resources and strategies, can be an important factor shaping the 
development of institutions at the local level for the management of water resources. From 
theoretical perspective therefore, it can be concluded that Okarongo is an important 
evidence that the development of institutions at the local level can be the by-product of a 
strategic conflict and not the result of the users’ attempts to achieve collective goals, as 
frequently assumed by the mainstream communal natural resource management theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
84
 No to mention, moreover, that in Okarongo it was not the government which gave the villagers 
management training and supplied them with a pump, but an independent humanitarian organization.  
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